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作者：Benoit, Jean-Pierre; Dubra, Juan
作者单位：Universidad de Montevideo; New York University
摘要：Auction theory has emphasized the importance of private information to the profits of bidders. However, the theory has failed to consider to what extent initially private information will remain private. We show that in a variety of contexts bidders will reveal their information, even if this information revelation is (ex ante) detrimental to them. Similarly, a seller may reveal her information although this revelation lowers revenues. We also show that bidders may be harmed by private informa...
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作者：Chong, Juin-Kuan; Camerer, Colin F.; Ho, Teck H.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU); National University of Singapore; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This paper tests a learning-based model of strategic teaching in repeated games with incomplete information. The repeated game has a long-run player whose type is unknown to a group of shortrun players. The proposed model assumes a fraction of 'short-run' players follow a one-parameter learning model (self-tuning EWA). In addition, some 'long-run' players are myopic while others are sophisticated and rationally anticipate how short-run players adjust their actions over time and teach the short...
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作者：Falk, A; Fischbacher, U
作者单位：University of Zurich; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of Bonn; University of Zurich
摘要：People are reciprocal if they reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. In this paper we present a formal theory of reciprocity. It takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by its underlying intention. The theory is in line with the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games, such as the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner's dilemma, and public goods...
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作者：Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Hasselt University; Maastricht University
摘要：We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (universities, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclic priority structure and the allocations are determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All ...
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作者：Kaminski, MM
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：In a rationing problem, a single homogeneous good is allocated among agents with possibly complex characteristics, or types. When types are single positive numbers (agents' claims), Young's theorem says that in the presence of continuity, a method of rationing is consistent and symmetric if and only if it can be represented by a continuous parametric function. This theorem is generalized to all separable type spaces. Related results include a characterization of non-continuous parametric metho...
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作者：Chambers, CP
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：We introduce a general class of rules for claims problems, called the difference rules, and demonstrate that a rule satisfies composition down and composition up if and only if it is a difference rule. We show that these rules are very simple to describe when there are two agents. In a variable population framework, we introduce a family of rules satisfying consistency, composition down, and composition up, which we term the logarithmic-proportional rules. These rules satisfy neither symmetry ...
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作者：Barbera, Salvador; Bevia, Carmen
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of N agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. We show that there exist social choice correspondences that choose locations and assign agents to them...
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作者：Smorodinsky, Rann; Tennenholtz, Moshe
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper addresses the question of multi-party computation in a model with asymmetric information. Each agent has a private value (secret), but in contrast to standard models, the agent incurs a cost when retrieving the secret. There is a social choice function the agents would like to compute and implement. All agents would like to perform a joint computation, which input is their vector of secrets. However, agents would like to free-ride on others' contribution. A mechanism which elicits p...
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作者：Binmore, K; Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London
摘要：Theories of focal points typically assume that games are accompanied by labelings or frames that relate the actions in the game to the environment in which the game is played. Attention then focuses on how players can exploit framing information to identify focal equilibria. This paper asks instead how evolutionary considerations determine which aspects of the environment are likely to be monitored by the players and hence appear as part of the framing information. Efficient monitoring turns o...
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作者：Montero, M
作者单位：University of Nottingham
摘要：This paper studies coalition formation, payoff division and expected payoffs in a divide the dollar by majority rule game with random proposers. A power index is called self-confirming if it can be obtained as an equilibrium of the game using the index itself as probability vector. Unlike the Shapley value and other commonly used power indices, the nucleolus has this property. The proof uses a weak version of Kohlberg's [SIAM J. Appl. Math. 20 (1971) 62] balancedness result reinterpreting the ...
