Asymmetric rules for claims problems without homogeneity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chambers, CP
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.005
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 241-260
• 关键词: Claims; bankruptcy; rationing; composition down; Composition up; homogeneity; Consistency

摘要

We introduce a general class of rules for claims problems, called the difference rules, and demonstrate that a rule satisfies composition down and composition up if and only if it is a difference rule. We show that these rules are very simple to describe when there are two agents. In a variable population framework, we introduce a family of rules satisfying consistency, composition down, and composition up, which we term the logarithmic-proportional rules. These rules satisfy neither symmetry nor homogeneity. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.