Locating public facilities by majority:: Stability, consistency and group formation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barbera, Salvador; Bevia, Carmen
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.002
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 185-200
• 关键词: social choice correspondences; conclorcet rules; STABILITY; Consistency; group formation; Simpson rule

摘要

We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of N agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. We show that there exist social choice correspondences that choose locations and assign agents to them in such a way that: (1) these decisions are Condorcet winners whenever one exists, (2) the majority of the users of each facility supports the choice of its location. and (3) no agent wishes to become a user of another facility, even ifthat could induce a change of its present location by majority voting. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.