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作者：Anderson, CM; Putterman, L
作者单位：Brown University; University of Rhode Island
摘要：The prospect of receiving a monetary sanction for free riding has been shown to increase contributions to public goods. We ask whether the impulse to punish is unresponsive to the cost to the punisher, or whether, like other preferences, it interacts with prices to generate a conventional demand curve. In a series of experiments, we randomly vary the cost of reducing the earnings of other group members following voluntary contribution decisions. In our design, new groups are formed after each ...
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Ok, Efe A.
作者单位：New York University
摘要：A commonly held belief in economics is that an individual's preferences that are revealed by her choices must be complete. This paper takes issue with this position by showing that one may be able to distinguish between indifference and indecisiveness of an agent upon observing her choice behavior. We relax the standard Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences (WARP) and show that a potent theory of individual choice (with and without risk) can be founded on this weaker axiom when it is coupled with...
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作者：Fujimoto, K; Kojadinovic, IK; Marichal, JL
作者单位：University of Luxembourg; Fukushima University; Nantes Universite
摘要：In the framework of cooperative game theory, the concept of interaction index, which can be regarded as an extension of that of value, has been recently proposed to measure the interaction phenomena among players. Axiomatizations of two classes of interaction indices, namely probabilistic interaction indices and cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices, generalizing probabilistic values and semivalues, respectively, are first proposed. The axioms we utilize are based on natural generalizatio...
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作者：Dindos, M; Mezzetti, C
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Brown University
摘要：We consider n-person games with quasi-concave payoffs that depend on a player's own action and the sum of all players' actions. We show that a discrete-time, stochastic process in which players move towards better replies-the better-reply dynamics-converges globally to a Nash equilibrium if actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements for all players around each Nash equilibrium that is asymptotically stable under a deterministic, adjusted best-reply dynamics. We present a...
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作者：González-Díaz, J
作者单位：Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
摘要：This paper characterizes the set of feasible payoffs of finitely repeated games with complete information that can be approximated arbitrarily closely by Nash equilibria. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Chakraborty, I
作者单位：University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman
摘要：A seller sells dissimilar objects while taking the auction rule as given. Should the seller sell the objects separately or as a bundle? Generally, when the number of bidders is small bundling helps to stimulate the competition and raise revenue. In this paper, we show that if entry is costly enough the process of endogenous participation generates sufficient competition to make bundling unnecessary in auctions. Thus whether a bundle auction generates a higher or a lower revenue ultimately depe...
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作者：Hojman, DA; Szeidl, A
作者单位：Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This paper studies a social game where agents choose their partners as well as their actions. Players interact with direct and indirect neighbors in the endogenous network. We show that the architecture of any nontrivial Nash equilibrium is minimally connected, and equilibrium actions approximate a symmetric equilibrium of the underlying game. We apply the model to analyze stochastic stability in 2 x 2 coordination games. We find that long-run equilibrium selection depends on a trade-off betwe...
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作者：Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：In this paper, we use p-best response sets-a. set-valued extension of p-dominance-in order to provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information: if there exists a set S which is a p-best response set with Sigma(I)(i) (= 1) p(i) < 1, and there exists a unique correlated equilibrium mu* whose support is in S then mu* is a robust Nash equilibrium. (c) 2005 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Osherson, Daniel; Vardi, Moshe Y.
作者单位：Princeton University; Rice University
摘要：We consider a panel of experts asked to assign probabilities to events, both logically simple and complex. The events evaluated by different experts are based on overlapping sets of variables but may otherwise be distinct. The union of all the judgments will likely be probabilistically incoherent. We address the problem of revising the probability estimates of the panel so as to produce a coherent set that best represents the group's expertise. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Faure-Grimaud, A; Reiche, S
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Cambridge
摘要：This paper shows that the inability of principals to commit to long-term contracts is irrelevant when dealing with several agents whose private information is correlated. This sharply contrasts with the dynamics of contracting without such correlation. The paper also explores what limitations on yardstick mechanisms can justify the use of long-term contracts. We found that the inability of a principal to commit not to renegotiate long-term contracts is without consequence even if there is a bo...
