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作者：Smith, K; Dickhaut, J
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Linkoping University
摘要：In two different types of institutions, English and Dutch auctions, we collect heart rate data, a proxy for emotion, to test hypotheses based on findings in neural science about the effect of emotion on economic behavior. We first demonstrate that recording heart rates does not distort prices in these auctions. Next we ask if knowledge of the intensity of a participant's emotional state improves our ability to predict price setting behavior beyond predictions of price based on usual economic v...
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作者：Feinberg, Y
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：The subjective framework is used to characterize the reasoning leading to an equilibrium refinement based on sequential rationality and Nash equilibrium in dynamic games. Equilibria based on sequential rationality require different reasoning on and off the equilibrium path for such solutions to emerge, or need arbitrary rules for reasoning depending on which game is played, We suggest a solution concept termed the reasonable solution based on maximization of confidence in rationality, equal tr...
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作者：Bhatt, M; Camerer, CF
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：Sixteen subjects' brain activity were scanned using fMRI as they made choices, expressed beliefs, and expressed iterated 2nd-order beliefs (what they think others believe they will do) in eight games. Cingulate cortex and prefrontal areas (active in theory of mind and social reasoning) are differentially activated in making choices versus expressing beliefs. Forming self-referential 2nd-order beliefs about what others think you will do seems to be a mixture of processes used to make choices an...
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作者：Ellingsen, T; Johannesson, M
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We study a bilateral trading relationship in which one agent. the seller, can make a nonrecoverable investment in order to generate potential gains from trade. Afterwards, the seller makes a price offer that the buyer can either accept or reject. If agents are fairminded. sellers who are known by the buyer to have high investment costs are predicted to charge higher prices. If the investment cost is private information, low-cost sellers should price more aggressively and high-cost sellers less...
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作者：Rustichini, A
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
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作者：Aramendía, M; Larrea, C; Ruiz, L
作者单位：University of Basque Country
摘要：We explore a new concept of renegotiation proofness in the symmetric repeated Cournot model with several players. We show that this concept significantly limits the cooperative outcomes that can be sustained in equilibrium. In particular, the symmetric monopoly outcome cannot be sustained when the number of players is high enough (9 in the case of the linear demand function). When the number of players tends to infinity, (i) the collusive benefits that could be sustained are at most four times...
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作者：van den Brink, R; van der Laan, G
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：A value function for cooperative games with transferable utility is a function which assigns to every such a game a distribution of the payoffs over the players. An alternative type of solutions are share functions which assign to every player its share in the payoffs to be distributed. In this paper we consider cooperative games in which the players are organized into an a priori coalition structure being a finite partition of the player set. We introduce a general method for defining share f...
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作者：Hildenbrand, W; Kneip, A
作者单位：University of Bonn; Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz
摘要：It is shown how one can effectively use microdata in modelling the change over time in an aggregate (e.g. mean consumption expenditure) of a large and heterogeneous population. The starting point of our aggregation analysis is a specification of explanatory variables on the micro-level. Typically, some of these explanatory variables are observable and others are unobservable. Based on certain hypotheses on the evolution over time of the joint distributions across the population of these explan...
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作者：Casella, A
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Motivated by the need for more flexible decision-making mechanisms in the European Union, the paper proposes a simple but novel voting scheme for binary decisions taken by committees that meet regularly over time. At each meeting, committee members are allowed to store their vote for future use; the decision is then taken according to the majority of votes cast. The possibility of shifting votes intertemporally allows agents to concentrate their votes when preferences are more intense, and alt...
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作者：Hokari, T
作者单位：University of Tsukuba
摘要：Many solutions for TU-games coincide with the standard solution for the two-agent case. We study its weighted generalizations. In particular, we study whether max consistency is compatible with 2-weighted-standardness. We show that on the domain of all TU-games, efficiency, 2-weighted-standardness, and max consistency jointly imply equal treatment of equals. It follows from this result that on the same domain, the prenucleolus is the only single-valued solution satisfying efficiency, 2-weighte...
