Games and Economic Behavior

最新文章

• AN EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION OF VANHUYCK, BATTALIO, AND BEIL EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ON COORDINATION AI翻译
  作者：CRAWFORD, VP
  作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
• EVOLUTION, LEARNING, AND ECONOMIC-BEHAVIOR AI翻译
  作者：SELTEN, R
  作者单位：University of Bonn
• VISCOUS POPULATION EQUILIBRIA AI翻译
  作者：MYERSON, RB; POLLOCK, GB; SWINKELS, JM
  作者单位：Northwestern University; Northwestern University; Stanford University
• On the strategyproof allocation of items under a budget constraint AI翻译
  作者：Cembrano, Javier; Klimm, Max; Knaack, Martin
  作者单位：Universidad de Chile; Technical University of Berlin
  摘要：We study a mechanism-design-without-money setting in which a designer is interested in selecting items with maximum total value under a budget constraint. The items, however, are controlled by strategic agents who aim to maximize the total value of their selected items. This setting arises naturally when agencies select projects for funding, retailers choose products to stock, or hospitals schedule MRI scans. A mechanism governing the selection is strategyproof if no agent can benefit by hidin...
• Rent dissipation and streamlined costs: Laboratory experiments☆ AI翻译
  作者：Holt, Charles A.; Smith, Angela M.
  作者单位：University of Virginia; James Madison University
  摘要：The effect of group size and effort cost on rent dissipation in the standard Tullock rent seeking model is examined using a laboratory experiment. Data support qualitative comparative static Nash equilibrium predictions as reductions in both group size and effort cost increase effort levels. However, effort and dissipation rates are above Nash predictions for all treatments. In addition, while cutting per-unit effort costs in half increases individual effort levels, they do not fully double as...
• A generalization of von Neumann's reduction from the assignment problem to zero-sum games AI翻译
  作者：Adler, Ilan; Bullinger, Martin; V. Vazirani, Vijay
  作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Bristol; University of California System; University of California Irvine
  摘要：The equivalence between von Neumann's Minimax Theorem for zero-sum games and the LP Duality Theorem connects cornerstone problems of the two fields of game theory and optimization, respectively, and has been the subject of intense scrutiny for seven decades. Yet, as observed in this paper, the proof of the difficult direction of this equivalence is unsatisfactory: It does not assign distinct roles to the two players of the game, as is natural from the definition of a zero-sum game. In retrospe...
• Inefficiency in a frictionless market AI翻译
  作者：Chan, Keith Jin Deng
  作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
  摘要：Gale and Sabourian (2006) argue that Markov strategies in dynamic matching and bargaining games accommodate non-competitive behavior: with heterogeneous players, outcomes may be inefficient. In this paper, I show that their corroborating example with four players does not comprise a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). In fact, I show that all MPEs must be efficient in their setting with only four players. Nevertheless, I construct a continuum of inefficient equilibria in a balanced market with s...
• Marginal contribution and singleton cores in one-sided matching and assignment AI翻译
  作者：Cho, Hyunjun; Kim, Jin Yeub; Park, Jaeok
  作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Yonsei University
  摘要：We examine the attainability of marginal contributions in two models of one-sided matching and assignment. For the one-sided matching problem, where agents in a single group are matched with each other, the core may be empty, and even when nonempty, some agents may fail to attain their marginal contributions in the core. By allowing fractional matchings, however, we guarantee the non-emptiness of the core and show that every agent's marginal contribution is attainable in the core. This implies...
• Guilt and fairness AI翻译
  作者：Stringhi, Alessandro
  作者单位：Prague University of Economics & Business
  摘要：Guilt aversion and inequity aversion are two pivotal concepts in understanding human behavior in situations involving trust dynamics. Inequity aversion explains trustworthiness through a preference for fairness, as trustworthiness leads to more equitable distributions. Conversely, guilt aversion posits that people act to avoid the guilt associated with betraying others. As both preferences provide justifications for trustworthiness, distinguishing between them solely through observed behavior ...
• Non-parametric identification and testing of quantal response equilibrium AI翻译
  作者：Hoelzemann, Johannes; Webb, Ryan; Xie, Erhao
  作者单位：University of Vienna; University of Toronto; Bank of Canada
  摘要：This paper studies the falsifiability and identification of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) when each player's utility and error distribution are relaxed to be unknown non-parametric functions. Using the variation of players' choices across a series of games, we first show that both the utility function and the distribution of errors are non-parametrically over-identified. This over-identification result further suggests a straightforward testing procedure for QRE which achieves the desired...