Efficient priority rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Hasselt University; Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.009
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 372-384
• 关键词: acyclic priority structures; deferred acceptance algorithm; indivisible objects; Priority rules

摘要

We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (universities, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclic priority structure and the allocations are determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.