The evolution of focal points
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Binmore, K; Samuelson, L
署名单位：
University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.005
发表日期：
2006
页码：
21-42
关键词：
摘要：
Theories of focal points typically assume that games are accompanied by labelings or frames that relate the actions in the game to the environment in which the game is played. Attention then focuses on how players can exploit framing information to identify focal equilibria. This paper asks instead how evolutionary considerations determine which aspects of the environment are likely to be monitored by the players and hence appear as part of the framing information. Efficient monitoring turns out to be an unlikely outcome. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.