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作者：Kocher, Martin; Strauss, Sabine; Sutter, Matthias
作者单位：Max Planck Society; University of Innsbruck; University of Cologne
摘要：Even though decision-making in small teams is pervasive in business and private life, little is known about subjects' preferences with respect to individual and team decision-making and about the consequences of respecting these preferences. We report the results from an experimental beauty-contest game where subjects could endogenously choose their preferred way of decision-making. About 60% of them preferred to decide in a team, and teams won the game significantly more often than individual...
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作者：Heifetz, Aviad
作者单位：Open University Israel
摘要：The existence of a common prior is a property of the state space used to model the players' incomplete information. We show that this property is not just a technical artifact of the model, but that it is immanent to the players' beliefs. To this end, we devise a condition, phrased solely in terms of the players' mutual beliefs about the basic, objective issues of possible uncertainty, which is equivalent to the existence of a common prior. This condition specifies a countable sequence of ques...
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作者：Bikhchandani, Sushil; Ostroy, Joseph M.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We show that an ascending price auction for multiple units of a homogeneous object proposed by Ausubel (i) raises prices for packages until they reach those nonlinear and non-anonymous market clearing prices at which bidders get their marginal products and (ii) the auction is a primal-dual algorithm applied to an appropriate linear programming formulation in which the dual solution yields those same market clearing prices. We emphasize the similarities with efficient incentive compatible ascen...
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作者：Galeotti, A; Goyal, S; Kamphorst, J
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：This paper extends the connections model of network formation by allowing for players who are heterogeneous with respect to values as well as the costs of forming links. Our principal result is that centrality and short average distances between individuals are robust features of equilibrium networks. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kugler, Tamar; Neeman, Zvika; Vulkan, Nir
作者单位：University of Arizona; Boston University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Oxford
摘要：We consider the consequences of competition between two types of experimental exchange mechanisms. a decentralized bargaining market, and a centralized market. It is shown that decentralized bargaining is subject to a process of unraveling in which relatively high value traders (buyers with a high willingness to pay and sellers with low costs) continuously find trading in the centralized markets more attractive until few opportunities for mutually beneficial trade remain outside the centralize...
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作者：Llerena, F; Rafels, C
作者单位：University of Barcelona
摘要：We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of a specific class of the convex games: the almost positive games. These games have non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above result we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All ...
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作者：Cox, James C.; Sadiraj, Vjollca
作者单位：University of Arizona; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Arizona; University of Amsterdam
摘要：A growing literature reports the conclusions that: (a) expected utility theory does not provide a plausible theory of risk aversion for both small-stakes and large-stakes gambles; and (b) this decision theory should be replaced with an alternative theory characterized by loss aversion. This paper explains that the arguments in previous literature fail to support these conclusions. Either concavity calibration has no general implication for expected utility theory or it has problematic implicat...
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作者：van Damme, Eric; Muller, Rudolf; Vohra, Rakesh V.
作者单位：Tilburg University; Hasselt University; Maastricht University; Northwestern University
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作者：Albizuri, M. J.; Aurrecoechea, J.; Zarzuelo, J. M.
作者单位：University of Basque Country
摘要：It is proposed an extension of the Owen's coalitional value so as to consider the possibility that players organize themselves in coalitions that are not necessarily disjoint. This extension is made through a random order approach; To complement this approach we offer a characterization of this value and a heuristic approach similar to the one given by Owen for the coalitional value. Moreover we introduce a second value that can be considered as the dual of the former one, which also extends t...
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作者：Larrea, Concepcion; Santos, J. C.
作者单位：University of Basque Country
摘要：We use the asymptotic approach to the cost allocation problem. In this way, we find the limit of linear solutions on discrete cost allocation problems which define solutions on continuum cost allocation problems. Particularly we analyze the Shapley-Shubik method, the discrete Aumann-Shapley method, the serial cost sharing method and the pseudo-average cost method. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
