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作者：Xu, Yongsheng; Yoshihara, Naoki
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：This paper studies compact and comprehensive bargaining problems for n players and axiomatically characterize the extensions of the three classical bargaining solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: the Nash solution, the egalitarian solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Our characterizing axioms are various extensions of Nash's original axioms. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Sandholm, Tuomas; Suri, Subhash
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：In most real-world (electronic) marketplaces, there are additional considerations besides maximizing immediate economic value. We present a sound way of taking such considerations into account via side constraints and non-price attributes, and show that side constraints (such as budget, limit on the number of winners, and exclusive-or) have a significant impact on the complexity of market clearing. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：de Frutos, MA; Pechlivanos, L
作者单位：National & Kapodistrian University of Athens; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：The literature has demonstrated that second-price common-value auctions are sensitive to the presence of asymmetries among bidders. In a two-bidder model, Bikhchandai [1988. Reputation in repeated second-price auctions. J. Econ. Theory 46, 97-119] has shown that if it is common knowledge that one bidder has a disadvantage compared to her opponent, that bidder (almost surely) never wins the auction. Employing a similar two-bidder model, this paper shows that this result does not carry over when...
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作者：Engle-Warnick, J; Slonim, RL
作者单位：McGill University; University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University
摘要：Although it is well known that trust and trustworthiness (i.e., the fulfillment of trust) are important behaviors for the fulfillment of incomplete contracts, less is known about how the economic environment influences them. In this paper we design an experiment to examine how exogenously determined (stochastic) past relationship lengths affect trust and trustworthiness in new relationships. We find that shorter-lasting relationships have an immediate negative impact on both behaviors in the r...
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作者：Lehmann, Benny; Lehmann, Daniel; Nisan, Noam
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：in most of microeconomic theory, consumers are assumed to exhibit decreasing marginal utilities. This paper considers combinatorial auctions among such submodular buyers. The valuations Of Such buyers are placed within a hierarchy of valuations that exhibit no complementarities, a hierarchy that includes also OR and XOR combinations of singleton valuations, and valuations satisfying the gross substitutes property. Those last valuations are shown to form a zero-measure subset of the submodular ...
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作者：Amir, R; Stepanova, A
作者单位：University of Arizona; University of Southern Denmark; University of Exeter
摘要：We consider the issue of first- versus second-mover advantage in differentiated-product Bertrand duopoly with general demand and asymmetric linear costs. We generalize existing results for all possible combinations where prices are either strategic substitutes and/or complements, dispensing with common extraneous and restrictive assumptions. We show that a firm with a sufficiently large cost lead over its rival has a first-mover advantage. For the linear version of the model, we invoke a natur...
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作者：Bhattacharya, A; Ziad, A
作者单位：University of York - UK; Universite de Caen Normandie
摘要：As a justification of the core as a set of stable social states, Sengupta and Sengupta [1996. A property of the core. Games Econ. Behav. 12, 266-273] show that for any transferable utility (TU) cooperative game with non-empty core, for every imputation outside the core there is an element in the core that indirectly dominates the imputation in a desirable way. In this note we show that this appealing property of the core no longer holds even for the class of hyperplane games, an immediate gene...
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作者：Morgan, J; Orzen, H; Sefton, M
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Nottingham
摘要：We report an experiment examining a simple clearing house model that generates price dispersion. According to this model, price dispersion arises because of consumer heterogeneity-some consumers are informed and simply buy from the firm offering the lowest price, while the remaining consumers are captive and shop based on considerations other than price. In our experiment we observe substantial and persistent price dispersion. We find that, as predicted, an increase in the fraction of informed...
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作者：Potters, J; Reijnierse, H; Biswas, A
作者单位：Tilburg University; Tilburg University; Indian Statistical Institute
摘要：This paper gives an algorithm for the nucleolus of simple flow games with directed and undirected, private as well as public arcs, under the condition that the flow game has a nonempty core. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Gueth, Werner; Muller, Wieland; Spiegel, Yossi
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Max Planck Society
摘要：We examine the strategic behavior of leaders and followers in sequential duopoly experiments with errors in communication: followers either perfectly observe the leaders' actions or else they observe nothing. Consistent with the theory, the leaders in our experiments enjoy a greater first-mover advantage when followers observe their actions with higher probability, albeit their advantage is weaker than the theory predicts and is only weakly increasing with the probability that their actions wi...
