Parametric rationing methods

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kaminski, MM
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of California System; University of California Irvine
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.013
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 115-133
• 关键词: rationing; allocation; bankruptcy; social choice; Fair division

摘要

In a rationing problem, a single homogeneous good is allocated among agents with possibly complex characteristics, or types. When types are single positive numbers (agents' claims), Young's theorem says that in the presence of continuity, a method of rationing is consistent and symmetric if and only if it can be represented by a continuous parametric function. This theorem is generalized to all separable type spaces. Related results include a characterization of non-continuous parametric methods and a simple criterion for deciding when a two-agent method can be consistently extended to a multi-agent method. An application to the multi-category bankruptcy problem is described. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.