-
作者：Casella, Alessandra; Gelman, Andrew; Palfrey, Thomas R.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Columbia University; Columbia University; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：The storable votes mechanism is a voting method for committees that meet periodically to consider a series of binary decisions. Each member is allocated a fixed budget of votes to be cast as desired over the sequence of decisions. This provides incentives for voters to spend more votes on those decisions that matter to them more, typically generating welfare gains over standard majority voting with non-storable votes. Equilibrium strategies have a very intuitive feature-the number of votes cas...
-
作者：Moulin, H; Sprumont, Y
作者单位：Rice University; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We propose two cost-sharing theories in which agents demand comparable commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility, agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same quantity pay the same price; this holds under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand-alone cost under full responsibility; this holds under partial res...
-
作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran
作者单位：New York University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：The well-being of agents is often directly affected by their beliefs, in the form of anticipatory feelings such as anxiety and hopefulness. Economists have tried to model this effect by introducing beliefs as arguments in decision makers' vNM utility function. One might expect that such a model would be capable of explaining anomalous attitudes to information that we observe in reality. We show that the model has several shortcomings in this regard, as long as Bayesian updating is retained. (c...
-
作者：Dubey, P; Haimanko, O; Zapechelnyuk, A
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We show that games of strategic complements, or substitutes, with aggregation are pseudopotential games. The upshot is that they possess Nash equilibria in pure strategies (NE), even if the strategy sets are not convex; and that various dynamic processes converge to NE. In particular, NE exist in Cournot oligopoly with indivisibilities in production. Our notion of aggregation is quite general and enables us to take a unified view of several disparate models. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights r...
-
作者：Arifovic, Jasmina; McKelvey, Richard D.; Pevnitskaya, Svetlana
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：We report on a design of a Turing tournament and its initial implementation to learning in repeated 2-person games. The principal objectives of the tournament, named after the original Turing Test, are (1) to find teaming algorithms (emulators) that most closely simulate human behavior, (2) to find algorithms (detectors) that most accurately distinguish between humans and machines, and (3) to provide a demonstration of how to implement this methodology for evaluating models of human behavior. ...
-
作者：Johari, Ramesh; Mannor, Shie; Tsitsiklis, John N.
作者单位：Stanford University; McGill University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We consider a network game where the nodes of the network wish to form a graph to route traffic between themselves. We present a model where costs are incurred for routing traffic, as well as for a lack of network connectivity. We focus on directed links and the link stability equilibrium concept, and characterize connected link stable equilibria. The structure of connected link stable networks is analyzed for several special cases. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Dellis, A; Oak, MP
作者单位：Williams College; University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii Manoa
摘要：We present a formal model of political competition under approval voting which allows for endogenous candidate entry. Our analysis yields a number of novel insights. First, we develop a notion of sincere voting behavior under approval voting, called relative sincerity. We then show that the relatively sincere voting behavior is consistent with the strategic calculus of voting. Second, we show that in a one-dimensional model with distance preferences, equilibria in relatively sincere strategies...
-
作者：McKelvey, Richard D.; Patty, John W.
作者单位：Harvard University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper provides a game-theoretic model of probabilistic voting and then examines the incentives faced by candidates in a spatial model of elections. In our model, voters' strategies form a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), which merges strategic voting and probabilistic behavior. We first show that a QRE in the voting game exists for all elections with a finite number of candidates, and then proceed to show that, with enough voters and the addition of a regularity condition on voters' ut...
-
作者：Lenzo, Justin; Sarver, Todd
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：We study a version of the multipopulation replicator dynamics, where each population is comprised of multiple subpopulations. We establish that correlated equilibrium is a natural solution concept in this setting. Specifically, we show that every correlated equilibrium is equivalent to a stationary state in the replicator dynamics of some subpopulation model. We also show that every interior stationary state, Lyapunov stable state, or limit of an interior solution is equivalent to a correlated...
-
作者：Berger, Ulrich; Hofbauer, Josef
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business; University of London; University College London
摘要：We present a class of games with a pure strategy being strictly dominated by another pure strategy such that the former survives along most solutions of the Brown-von Neurnann-Nash dynamics. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
