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作者：Jullien, B.; Mariotti, T.
作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：A seller possessing private information about the quality of a good attempts to sell it through a second-price auction with announced reserve price. The choice of a reserve price transmits information to the buyers. We characterize the equilibria with monotone beliefs of the resulting signaling game and show that they lead to a reduced probability of selling the good compared to the symmetric information situation. We compare the unique separating equilibrium of this signaling game to the equi...
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作者：Ockenfels, Axel; Roth, Alvin E.
作者单位：University of Cologne; Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：In second price Internet auctions with a fixed end time, such as those on eBay, many bidders submit their bids in the closing minutes or seconds of an auction. We propose an internet auction model, in which very late bids have a positive probability of not being successfully submitted, and show that late bidding in a fixed deadline auction can occur at equilibrium in auctions both with private values and with uncertain, dependent values. Late bidding may also arise Out of equilibrium, as a bes...
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作者：Lebrun, B
作者单位：York University - Canada
摘要：If the value cumulative distribution functions are strictly log-concave at the highest lower extremity of their supports, a simple geometric argument establishes the uniqueness of the equilibrium of the first-price auction in the asymmetric independent private values model. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Noussair, C; Silver, J
作者单位：Emory University
摘要：This paper analyzes the behavior of single-unit all-pay auctions within the independent private values environment in the laboratory. We study revenue, individual bidding behavior, and efficiency, in relation to theoretical benchmarks and to a similar study of winner-pay first-price sealed-bid auctions. We conclude that the all-pay auction yields significantly higher revenue than both the risk-neutral Bayesian equilibrium and the winner-pay auction. Bidders' decisions move closer to equilibriu...
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作者：Renault, J; Scarlatti, S; Scarsini, M
作者单位：University of Turin; G d'Annunzio University of Chieti-Pescara; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：We study a particular case of repeated games with public signals. In the stage game an odd number of players have to choose simultaneously one of two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room receive a reward of one euro (whence the name minority game). The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only the current majority room is publicly announced. We show that in the infinitely repeated game any feasible payoff can be achieved as a uniform equil...
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作者：Dubey, P; Einy, E; Haimanko, O
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We present three axioms for a power index defined on the domain of simple (voting) games. Positivity requires that no voter has negative power, and at least one has positive power. Transfer requires that, when winning coalitions are enhanced in a game, the change in voting power depends only on the change in the game, i.e., on the set of new winning coalitions. The most crucial axiom is composition: the value of a player in a compound voting game is the product of his power in the relevant fir...
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作者：Takahashi, S
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We consider infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information. A game is a K-coordination game if each player can decrease other players' payoffs by at most K times his own cost of punishment. The number K represents the degree of commonality of payoffs among the players. The smaller K is, the more interest the players share. A K-coordination game tapers off if the greatest payoff variation conditional on the first t periods of an efficient history converges to 0 at a rate faster...
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作者：Asheim, GB; Perea, A
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Oslo
摘要：Within an epistemic model for two-player extensive games, we formalize the event that each player believes that his opponent chooses rationally at all information sets. Letting this event be common certain belief yields the concept of sequential rationalizability Adding preference for cautious behavior to this event likewise yields the concept of quasi-perfect rationalizability. These concepts are shown to (a) imply backward induction in generic perfect information games, and (b) be non-equili...
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作者：de Clippel, G
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：Myerson's [Cooperative games with incomplete information. Int. J. Game Theory 13 (1984) 6996] extension of the lambda-transfer value to cooperative games with incomplete information focuses among other things on the strength of the incentive constraints at the solution for determining the power of coalitions. We construct an intuitive three-player game where the player whose only contribution is to partly release the two other players from the incentive constraints they face when they cooperat...
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作者：Karni, E; Postlewaite, A
