Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Montero, M
• 署名单位: University of Nottingham
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.01.001
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 380-397
• 关键词: Coalition formation; bargaining; majority games; Nucleolus; Power indices; balancedness

摘要

This paper studies coalition formation, payoff division and expected payoffs in a divide the dollar by majority rule game with random proposers. A power index is called self-confirming if it can be obtained as an equilibrium of the game using the index itself as probability vector. Unlike the Shapley value and other commonly used power indices, the nucleolus has this property. The proof uses a weak version of Kohlberg's [SIAM J. Appl. Math. 20 (1971) 62] balancedness result reinterpreting the balancing weights as probabilities in a mixed strategy equilibrium. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.