A theory of reciprocity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Falk, A; Fischbacher, U
• 署名单位: University of Zurich; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of Bonn; University of Zurich
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.001
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 293-315
• 关键词: reciprocity; fairness; COOPERATION; COMPETITION; game theory

摘要

People are reciprocal if they reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. In this paper we present a formal theory of reciprocity. It takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by its underlying intention. The theory is in line with the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games, such as the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner's dilemma, and public goods games. Furthermore, it predicts that identical consequences trigger different reciprocal responses in different environments. Finally, the theory explains why outcomes tend to be fair in bilateral interactions whereas extremely unfair distributions may arise in competitive markets. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.