Information revelation in auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Benoit, Jean-Pierre; Dubra, Juan
• 署名单位: Universidad de Montevideo; New York University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.004
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 181-205
• 关键词: Auctions; Information revelation; unraveling

摘要

Auction theory has emphasized the importance of private information to the profits of bidders. However, the theory has failed to consider to what extent initially private information will remain private. We show that in a variety of contexts bidders will reveal their information, even if this information revelation is (ex ante) detrimental to them. Similarly, a seller may reveal her information although this revelation lowers revenues. We also show that bidders may be harmed by private information, even in contexts where more information has traditionally been presumed to be beneficial. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserverd.