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作者：McLean, R; Postlewaite, A
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：We analyze the ex ante incentive compatible core for replicated private information economics. We show that any allocation in the core when the economy is replicated sufficiently often is approximately Walrasian for the associated Arrow-Debreu economy. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Orzach, R; Tauman, Y
作者单位：Wayne State University; Tulane University; Tel Aviv University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：Following Spence, this note provides an education signaling model to explain the phenomenon of gifted entrepreneurs who acquire less education than ordinary individuals. Two types of individuals, ordinary and gifted, are considered. Each one of them can either convince an investor to fund his enterprise or approach a competitive job market. The probability that an ordinary individual succeeds to establish a successful enterprise is smaller than that of a gifted individual irrespective of his e...
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作者：Hopkins, E; Posch, M
作者单位：University of Edinburgh; Medical University of Vienna
摘要：This paper investigates the properties of the most common form of reinforcement learning (the basic model of Erev and Roth) [Amer. Econ. Rev. 88 (1998) 848-881]. Stochastic approximation theory has been used to analyse the local stability of fixed points under this learning process. However, as we show, when such points are on the boundary of the state space, for example, pure strategy equilibria, standard results from the theory of stochastic approximation do not apply. We offer what we belie...
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作者：Feinberg, Y
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：A unified framework is developed for representation of, and reasoning about dynamic games. A game is described by the subjective knowledge of players at hypothetical situations-the epistemic game form. Subjective knowledge-termed confidence-allows us to replace objective reasoning about hypothetical events with reasoning about the confidence of hypothetical identities, i.e., the subjective reasoning of players in hypothetical situations. This leads to an endogenous definition for players* acti...
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作者：Ju, BG
作者单位：University of Kansas
摘要：We consider risk sharing problems with a single good and a finite number of states. Agents have a common prior and their preferences are represented in the expected utility form and are risk averse. We study efficient and individually rational risk sharing rules satisfying strategy-proofness, the requirement that no one can ever benefit by misrepresenting his preference. When aggregate certainty holds, we show that fixed price selections from Walrasian correspondence are the only rules satisfy...
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作者：Mailath, GJ; Postlewaite, A; Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We examine contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria, in which a player's actions after every history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within epsilon of a best response. This concept implies, but is stronger than, Radner's ex ante perfect epsilon-equilibrium. A strategy profile is a contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibrium of a game if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium in a perturbed game with nearly the same payoffs, with the converse holding for pure e...
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作者：Goeree, JK; Holt, CA
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Virginia
摘要：This paper reports data for coordination game experiments with random matching. The experimental design is based on changes in an effort-cost parameter, which do not alter the set of Nash equilibria nor do they alter the predictions of adjustment theories based on imitation or best response dynamics. As expected, however, increasing the effort cost lowers effort levels. Maximization of a stochastic potential function, a concept that generalizes risk dominance to continuous games, predicts this...
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作者：Samet, D; Safra, Z
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：A solution to bargaining problems is ordinal when it is covariant with respect to order-preserving transformations of utility. Shapley has constructed an ordinal, symmetric, efficient solution to three-player problems. Here, we extend Shapley's solution in two directions. First, we extend it to more than three players. Second, we show that this extension lends itself to the construction of a continuum of ordinal, symmetric, efficient solutions. The construction makes use of ordinal path-valued...
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作者：Hofbauer, J; Hopkins, E
作者单位：University of Edinburgh; University of London; University College London
摘要：We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2-person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response dynamics. A mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable under all such dynamics if and only if the game is linearly equivalent to a zero sum game. In this case, the mixed equilibrium is also globally asymptotically stable. Global convergence to the set of perturbed equilibria is shown also for (resealed) partnership games, also known as potential games. Lastly, mixed equilibria o...
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作者：Harris, CJ; Stinchcombe, MB; Zame, WR
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of London; King's College London
摘要：Normal form games are nearly compact and continuous (NCC) if they can be understood as games played on strategy spaces that are dense subsets of the strategy spaces of larger compact games, with jointly continuous payoffs. There are intrinsic algebraic, measure theoretic, functional analysis, and finite approximability characterizations of NCC games. NCC games have finitely additive equilibria, and all their finitely additive equilibria are equivalent to countably additive equilibria on metric...
