-
作者：Goyal, S; Vega-Redondo, F
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat d'Alacant; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; University of Essex; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：This paper develops a simple model to examine the interaction between partner choice and individual behavior in games of coordination. An important ingredient of our approach is the way we model partner choice: we suppose that a player can establish ties with other players by unilaterally investing in costly pairwise links. In this context, individual efforts to balance the costs and benefits of links are shown to lead to a unique equilibrium interaction architecture. The dynamics of network f...
-
作者：Fréchette, GR; Kagel, JH; Morelli, M
作者单位：New York University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We compare Gamson's Law, a popular empirical model of legislative bargaining, with two noncooperative bargaining models in three players divide the dollar games in which no player has enough votes to form a winning coalition on their own. Both of the game theoretic models better organize the comparative static data resulting from changes in nominal bargaining power than does Gamson's Law. We also identify deviations from the point predictions of the non-cooperative bargaining models. Namely, p...
-
作者：Meirowitz, A
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：We investigate the incentives faced by poll respondents when candidates use polling data to inform their selection of policy platforms. Focusing on models with a unidimensional policy space, single peaked preferences and two office-seeking candidates observing a summary statistic from polls that ask respondents their preferences, we find that for most environments honest poll response cannot occur in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. However, simple partially-revealing equilibria exist when the ...
-
作者：Knutson, B; Peterson, R
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：While the concept of expected utility informs many theories of decision making, little is known about whether and how the human brain might compute this quantity. This article reviews a series of functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI) experiments designed to localize brain regions that respond in anticipation of increasing amounts of monetary incentives. These studies collectively suggest that anticipation of increasing monetary gains activates a subcortical region of the ventral striatu...
-
作者：Okada, A; Riedl, A
作者单位：Tinbergen Institute; University of Amsterdam
摘要：This paper experimentally investigates the impact of reciprocal behavior in multilateral bargaining and coalition formation. Our results show that reciprocal fairness strongly affects the efficiency and equity of coalition formation. In a large majority of cases, inefficient and unfair coalitions are chosen when their coalition values are relatively high. Up to one third of the experimental population is excluded from bargaining and earns nothing. In monetary terms economically significant eff...
-
作者：Duffy, J; Hopkins, E
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Edinburgh
摘要：Previous data from experiments on market entry games, N-player games where each player faces a choice between entering a market and staying out, appear inconsistent with either mixed or pure Nash equilibria. Here we show that, in this class of game, learning theory predicts sorting, that is, in the long run, agents play a pure strategy equilibrium with some agents permanently in the market, and some permanently out. We conduct experiments with a larger number of repetitions than in previous wo...
-
作者：Thomson, W
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：We construct simple games implementing in Nash equilibria several solutions to the problem of fair division. These solutions are the no-envy solution, which selects the allocations such that no agent would prefer someone else's bundle to his own. and several variants of this solution, Components of strategies can be interpreted as allocations, consumption bundles, permutations, points in simplices of dimensionalities equal to the number of goods or to the number of agents, and integers, We als...
-
作者：Battaglini, M
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：Dekel and Piccione [2000. Sequential voting procedures in symmetric binary elections. J. Polit. Economy 108, 34-55] have proven that information cascades do not necessarily affect the proper-ties of information aggregation in sequential elections: under standard conditions, any symmetric equilibrium of a simultaneous voting mechanism is also an equilibrium of the correspondent sequential mechanism. We show that when voters can abstain, these results are sensitive to the introduction of an arbi...
-
作者：Stinchcombe, MB
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：Infinite normal form games that are mathematically simple have been treated [ Harris, C.J., Stinch-combe, M.B., Zame, W.R., in press. Nearly compact and continuous normal form games: characterizations and equilibrium existence. Games Econ. Behav.]. Under study in this paper are the other infinite normal form games, a class that includes the normal forms of most extensive form games with infinite choice sets. Finitistic equilibria are the limits of approximate equilibria taken along generalized...
-
作者：Chun, Y; Thomson, W
作者单位：University of Rochester; Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：We study the behavior of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims when there is a large number of claimants with small claims. We model such situations by replicating some basic problem. We show that under replication, the random arrival rule [Math. Soc. Sci. 2 (1982) 345] behave's like the proportional rule. the rule that is the most often recommended in this context. Also. under replication, the minimal overlap rule [Math. Soc. Sci. 2 (1982) 345] behaves like the constrained equal lo...
