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作者：Gentzkow, Matthew; Kamenica, Emir
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Chicago
摘要：A number of senders with no ex ante private information publicly choose signals whose realizations they observe privately. Senders then convey verifiable messages about their signal realizations to a receiver who takes a non-contractible action that affects the welfare of all players. The space of available signals includes all conditional distributions of signal realizations and allows any sender to choose a signal that is arbitrarily correlated with signals of others. We characterize the inf...
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作者：Kellner, Christian; Le Quement, Mark T.
作者单位：University of Southampton; University of East Anglia
摘要：We study cheap talk communication in a simple two actions-two states model featuring an ambiguous state distribution. Equilibrium behavior of both sender (S) and receiver (R) features mixing and we relate each agent's randomization to a specific mode of ambiguous communication. For sufficiently high ambiguity, implementing the S-optimal decision rule with only two messages is impossible if R has aligned preferences. This may in contrast be possible if R has misaligned preferences. Adding a lit...
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作者：Selcuk, Cemil
作者单位：Cardiff University
摘要：We investigate price mechanism selection in a setting where sellers compete for budget constrained buyers by adopting either fixed pricing or auctions (first or second price). We show that first and second price auctions are payoff equivalent when some bidders are financially constrained, so sellers are indifferent to adopt either format. We characterize possible equilibria and show that if the budget is high, then sellers compete via fixed pricing, if it is low then they compete via auctions,...
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作者：Erdamar, Bora; Sanver, M. Remzi; Sato, Shin
作者单位：University of Rochester; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Information Sciences & Technologies (INS2I); Fukuoka University; Bahcesehir University
摘要：We consider manipulation of collective decision making rules in a framework where voters not only rank candidates but also evaluate them as acceptable or unacceptable. In this richer informational setting, we adopt a new notion of strategy-proofness, called evaluationwise strategy-proofness, where incentives of manipulation exist if and only if a voter can replace an outcome which he finds unacceptable with an acceptable one. Evaluationwise strategy-proofness is weaker than strategy-proofness....
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作者：Ding, Tingting; Schotter, Andrew
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; New York University
摘要：While, in theory, the school matching problem is a static non-cooperative one-shot game, in reality the matching game is played by parents who choose their strategies after consulting or chatting with other parents in their social networks. In this paper we compare the performance of the Boston and the Gale-Shapley mechanisms in the presence of chatting through social networks. Our results indicate that allowing subjects to chat has an important impact on the likelihood that subjects change th...
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作者：Flesch, Janos; Vermeulen, Dries; Zseleva, Anna
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We consider two-player zero-sum games with infinite action spaces and bounded payoff functions. The players' strategies are finitely additive probability measures, called charges. Since a strategy profile does not always induce a unique expected payoff, we distinguish two extreme attitudes of players. A player is viewed as pessimistic if he always evaluates the range of possible expected payoffs by the worst one, and a player is viewed as optimistic if he always evaluates it by the best one. T...
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作者：Lugovskyy, Volodymyr; Puzzello, Daniela; Sorensen, Andrea; Walker, James; Williams, Arlington
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Southern Illinois University System; Southern Illinois University
摘要：A growing literature in experimental economics examines the conditions under which cooperation can be sustained in social-dilemma settings. In particular, several recent studies contrast cooperation levels in games in which the number of decision rounds is probabilistic to games in which the number of decision rounds is finite. We contribute to this literature by contrasting the evolution of cooperation in probabilistically and finitely repeated linear voluntary-contribution public-goods games...
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作者：Chen, Roy; Chen, Yan; Liu, Yang; Mei, Qiaozhu
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Tsinghua University
摘要：We investigate the effects of team competition on pro-social lending activity on Kiva.org, the first microlending website to match lenders with entrepreneurs in developing countries. Using naturally occurring field data, we find that lenders who join teams contribute 1.2 more loans ($30-$42) per month than those who do not. To further explore factors that differentiate successful teams from dormant ones, we run a large scale randomized field experiment (n = 22,233) by posting forum messages. C...
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作者：Kraehmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland
作者单位：University of Bonn; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：We show that every sequential screening model is equivalent to a standard text book static screening model. We use this result and apply well-established techniques from static screening to obtain solutions for classes of sequential screening models for which standard sequential screening techniques are not applicable. Moreover, we identify the counterparts of well-understood features of the static screening model in the corresponding sequential screening model such as the single-crossing cond...
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作者：Kim, Semin
作者单位：Yonsei University
摘要：We consider the performance and incentive compatibility of voting rules in a Bayesian environment: agents have independent private values, there are at least three alternatives, and monetary transfers are prohibited. First, we show that in a neutral environment, meaning alternatives are symmetric ex-ante, essentially any ex-post Pareto efficient ordinal rule is incentive compatible. Importantly, however, we can improve upon ordinal rules. We show that we can design an incentive compatible card...
