An experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lugovskyy, Volodymyr; Puzzello, Daniela; Sorensen, Andrea; Walker, James; Williams, Arlington
• 署名单位: Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Southern Illinois University System; Southern Illinois University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.004
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 286-302
• 关键词: Social dilemmas; public goods games; Experimental economics; repeated games

摘要

A growing literature in experimental economics examines the conditions under which cooperation can be sustained in social-dilemma settings. In particular, several recent studies contrast cooperation levels in games in which the number of decision rounds is probabilistic to games in which the number of decision rounds is finite. We contribute to this literature by contrasting the evolution of cooperation in probabilistically and finitely repeated linear voluntary-contribution public-goods games (VCM). Consistent with past results, ceteris paribus, cooperation is found to increase in the marginal value of the public good. Additionally, as the number of decision sequences increases, there is a pronounced decrease in cooperation in the final round of finite sequences compared to those with a probabilistic end round. We do not, however, find consistent evidence that overall cooperation rates are affected by whether the number of decision rounds is finite or determined probabilistically. (c) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.