Does team competition increase pro-social lending? Evidence from online microfinance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Roy; Chen, Yan; Liu, Yang; Mei, Qiaozhu
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Tsinghua University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.001
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 311-333
• 关键词: Social identity; Pro-social lending; microfinance; field experiment

摘要

We investigate the effects of team competition on pro-social lending activity on Kiva.org, the first microlending website to match lenders with entrepreneurs in developing countries. Using naturally occurring field data, we find that lenders who join teams contribute 1.2 more loans ($30-$42) per month than those who do not. To further explore factors that differentiate successful teams from dormant ones, we run a large scale randomized field experiment (n = 22,233) by posting forum messages. Compared to the control, we find that lenders make significantly more loans when exposed to a goal-setting and coordination message, whereas goal-setting alone significantly increases lending activities of previously inactive teams. Our findings suggest that goal-setting and coordination are effective mechanisms to increase pro-social behavior in teams. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.