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作者：Jelnov, Artyom; Tauman, Yair; Zeckhauser, Richard
作者单位：Ariel University; Reichman University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Harvard University
摘要：Nation 1 wants to develop a nuclear bomb (or other weapons of mass destruction). Nation 2, its enemy, wants to prevent this, either by requiring that 1 open his facilities, or through a pinpoint strike if her imperfect intelligence system (IS) indicates a bomb is present or imminent. If 1 refuses full inspection, 2 can attack 1 or not. l's cost for allowing inspection, private information, can be either high, H, or low, L. The game's unique sequential equilibrium will be separating or pooling,...
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作者：Klaus, Bettina
作者单位：University of Lausanne
摘要：For classical marriage markets with equal numbers of men and women and where all men find all women acceptable and all women find all men acceptable, Sasaki and Toda (1992) characterized the core by same-side anonymity for marriage markets, Pareto optimality, consistency, and converse consistency. Nizamogullari and Ozkal-Sanver (2014) generalized this result to the domain of classical marriage markets by adding individual rationality and replacing same-side anonymity for marriage markets with ...
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作者：Herbst, Luisa; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian
作者单位：Max Planck Society; Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is higher if power is more imbalanced. Even though endogenous bargaining outcomes reflect the players' unequal fighting strengths, strategic ...
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作者：Dold, Malte; Khadjavi, Menusch
作者单位：University of Freiburg; Leibniz Association; Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel (IFW); University of Kiel
摘要：We present a three-player queuing game to study procedural preferences in a laboratory experiment. Together with markets, queues and waiting lists are universal procedures for allocating goods and services. We designed our queuing game to disentangle motivations of outcome-oriented egoistic preferences, outcome-oriented distributional (inequality aversion) preferences and outcome-independent procedural preferences. In a series of treatments, we introduce a market element and allow two of the t...
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作者：Wang, Tao
作者单位：Zhejiang University; Queens University - Canada
摘要：In this paper, we analyze a dynamic game of pure information externality. Each player receives a private signal and chooses whether and when to invest. Bunching occurs when a subgroup of the players make decisions contingent on their signals, while the rest of the players wait regardless of their signals. We focus on asymmetric pure strategy equilibria, where players' private information is revealed gradually through bunching. When players become patient enough, the most efficient equilibrium ...
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作者：McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Much of the literature on mechanism design and implementation uses the revelation principle to restrict attention to direct mechanisms. We showed in McLean and Postlewaite (2014) that when agents are informationally small, there exist small modifications to VCG mechanisms in interdependent value problems that restore incentive compatibility. We show here how one can construct a two-stage non-direct mechanism that similarly restores incentive compatibility while improving upon the direct one st...
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作者：Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We study many-to-many matching markets in which agents from a set A are matched to agents from a disjoint set B through a two-stage non-revelation mechanism. In the first stage, A-agents, who are endowed with a quota that describes the maximal number of agents they can be matched to, simultaneously make proposals to the B-agents. In the second stage, B-agents sequentially, and respecting the quota, choose and match to available A-proposers. We study the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the i...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Mueller-Frank, Manuel
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：We address the question to which degree the private information of a decision maker is revealed through his optimal action, in an environment with compact metrizable state and action space. We show that the decision maker's optimal action reveals his posterior distribution for a generic set of continuous utility functions if and only if the set of actions contains no isolated points. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Acharya, Avidit; Meirowitz, Adam
作者单位：Stanford University; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) showed that sincere informative voting is not typically an equilibrium of the Condorcet voting model when the size of the electorate is large. Here, we reverse their finding by adding a third type of voter one that receives no information in favor of either of the alternatives as well as global uncertainty about the probability that each voter is such a no evidence type. The expected number of no evidence type voters can be arbitrarily small; nevertheless, if the ...
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作者：Bouton, Laurent; Castanheira, Micael; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol
作者单位：Georgetown University; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National Bureau of Economic Research; Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：The rational-voter model is often criticized on the grounds that two of its central predictions (the paradox of voting and Duverger's Law) are at odds with reality. Recent theoretical advances suggest that these empirically unsound predictions might be an artifact of an (arguably unrealistic) assumption: the absence of aggregate uncertainty about the distribution of preferences in the electorate. In this paper, we propose direct empirical evidence of the effects of aggregate uncertainty in mul...
