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作者：Midjord, Rune; Rodriguez Barraquer, Tomas; Valasek, Justin
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：We consider a committee of experts that decides to approve or reject an innovation on behalf of society. In addition to a payoff linked to the correctness of the committee's decision, each expert receives disesteem payoffs if he/she votes in favor of an ill-fated innovation or votes against an innovation that proves to be beneficial. We find that the predictions of the model are sensitive to the signal technology. In the standard Condorcet framework experts' signals are i.i.d. conditional on t...
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作者：Wilson, Alistair J.; Wu, Hong
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
摘要：We theoretically and experimentally examine the effects from adding a simple, empirically relevant action to a repeated partnership, the option to walk away. Manipulating both the value of the outside option, and its relative distribution among the partners, we examine the behavior of human subjects in a repeated prisoners' dilemma. In particular, we examine the degree of cooperation and the form of punishments used. Our findings indicate that cooperation rates are broadly unaffected by the va...
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作者：Leme, Renato Paes
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：The concept of gross substitute valuations was introduced by Kelso and Crawford as a sufficient conditions for the existence of Walrasian equilibria in economies with indivisible goods. The proof is algorithmic in nature: gross substitutes is exactly the condition that enables a natural price adjustment procedure - known as Walrasian tatonnement - to converge to equilibrium. The same concept was also introduced independently in other communities with different names: M-(sic)-concave functions ...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Makhdoumi, Ali; Malekian, Azarakhsh; Ozdaglar, Asuman
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Toronto
摘要：We study the effects of privacy concerns on social network formation. Each individual decides which others to form links with. Links bring direct benefits from friendship but also lead to the sharing of information via a percolation process. Privacy concerns are modeled as a disutility that the individual suffers as a result of her private information being acquired by others. We specify conditions under which pure-strategy equilibria exist and characterize both pure-strategy and mixed-strateg...
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作者：Mengel, Friederike; Rivas, Javier
作者单位：University of Essex; University of Bath
摘要：We study efficiency and information aggregation in common value elections with continuous private signals and informative priors. We show that small elections are not generally efficient and that there are equilibria where some voters vote against their private signal even if it provides useful information and abstention is allowed. This is not the case in large elections, where the fraction of voters who vote against their private signal tends to zero. In an experiment, we then study how info...
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作者：Little, Andrew T.
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：I develop a theory of propaganda which affects mass behavior without necessarily affecting mass beliefs. A group of citizens observe a signal of their government's performance, which is upwardly inflated by propaganda. Citizens want to support the government if it performs well and if others are supportive (i.e., to coordinate). Some citizens are unaware of the propaganda (credulous). Because of the coordination motive, the non-credulous still respond to propaganda, and when the coordination m...
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作者：Schmidbauer, Eric
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Central Florida
摘要：Each of n experts communicates with a principal about the privately observed quality of the expert's own project via cheap talk, with new independently drawn projects available each period until the principal adopts one. Even when experts are highly biased in that they only receive a positive payoff if their own project is selected, we show that informative equilibria may exist, characterize a large class of stationary equilibria, and find the Pareto dominant symmetric equilibrium. Experts fac...
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作者：Currarini, Sergio; Fumagalli, Elena; Panebianco, Fabrizio
作者单位：University of Leicester; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Utrecht University; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We study linear quadratic games played on a network. Agents face peer effects with distance-one neighbors, and strategic substitution with distance-two neighbors (local congestion). For this class of games, we show that an interior equilibrium exists both in the high and in the low regions of the largest eigenvalue, but may not exist in the intermediate region. In the low region, equilibrium is proportional to a weighted version of Bonacich centrality, where weights are themselves centrality m...
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作者：Xefteris, Dimitrios
作者单位：University of Cyprus
摘要：It is known that multidimensional Downsian competition fails to admit an equilibrium in pure strategies unless very stringent conditions on the distribution of voters' bliss points are imposed (Plott, 1967). This paper revisits this problem considering that the two vote share maximizing candidates are differentiated. That is, candidates strategically decide positions only in some of the n dimensions while in the rest of them their positions are assumed to be fixed. These fixed dimensions may b...
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作者：Charness, Gary; Dave, Chetan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：We investigate whether the confirmation bias is mitigated in signal-extraction environments by outside financial interests. We include a background strategic consideration leading to 'motivated beliefs' for people in one role, as they receive higher equilibrium payoffs in a background game in one of two states, while people in the other role receive the same equilibrium payoffs in both. We find systematic differences in beliefs and our results suggest that players with motivated beliefs deviat...
