Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: A mechanism design approach

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kim, Semin
• 署名单位: Yonsei University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.012
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 350-371
• 关键词: Ordinal rule; Pareto efficiency; incentive compatibility; Bayesian mechanism design

摘要

We consider the performance and incentive compatibility of voting rules in a Bayesian environment: agents have independent private values, there are at least three alternatives, and monetary transfers are prohibited. First, we show that in a neutral environment, meaning alternatives are symmetric ex-ante, essentially any ex-post Pareto efficient ordinal rule is incentive compatible. Importantly, however, we can improve upon ordinal rules. We show that we can design an incentive compatible cardinal rule which achieves higher utilitarian social welfare than any ordinal rule. Finally, we provide numerical findings about incentive compatible cardinal rules that maximize utilitarian social welfare. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.