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作者：Chatterjee, Kalyan; Das, Kaustav
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Exeter
摘要：We study a model of decentralised bilateral interactions in a small market where one of the sellers has private information about her value. In addition to this seller with private information, there are two identical buyers and another seller, whose valuation is commonly known to be in between the two possible valuations of the seller with private information. We consider an infinite horizon game with simultaneous one-sided offers and simultaneous responses. We construct one particular PBE of...
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作者：Garrett, Daniel F.
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We study the optimal mechanism in a dynamic sales relationship where the buyer's arrival date is uncertain, and where his value changes stochastically over time. The buyer's arrival date is the first date at which contracting is feasible and is his private information. To induce immediate participation, the buyer is granted positive expected rents even if his value at arrival is the lowest possible. The buyer is punished for arriving late; i.e., he expects to earn less of the surplus. Optimal ...
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作者：Deckelbaum, Alan; Micali, Silvio
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Green and Laffont proved that no collusion-resilient dominant-strategy mechanism, whose strategies consist of individual valuations, guarantees efficiency in multi-unit auctions. Chen and Micali bypassed this impossibility by slightly enlarging the strategy spaces, yet assuming knowledge of the maximum value a player may have for a copy of the good, and the ability of imposing high fines on the players. For unrestricted combinatorial auctions, efficiency in collusion-resilient dominant strateg...
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作者：Linardi, Sera
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：This paper shows that the basic unit of information aggregation described by the Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) posterior revision process does not always produce public statistics that are closer to the full information posterior than the common prior. I study this process of back and forth communication between two individuals with private signals by introducing white noise into payoff computations, defining the evolution of common knowledge, and providing conjectures on the resulting ...
