-
作者：Demange, Gabrielle
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：The paper analyzes the optimal targeting strategies of a planner (a governmental agency, a firm) who aims to increase the aggregate action of a population. The agents interact through a social network and react to their exposure to neighbors' actions. The reaction function describes, for example, the best response in a strategic game, a mechanical influence in a contagion disease or a mimetic behavior. The reaction is assumed to be increasing in exposure, resulting in complementarity in action...
-
作者：Hinnosaar, Toomas
作者单位：Collegio Carlo Alberto
摘要：I study the dynamic mechanism design problem of a monopolist selling a fixed number of service slots to randomly arriving, short-lived buyers with heterogeneous values. The fully optimal mechanism is a non-standard auction in which bidders' payoffs are non-monotone in their opponents' bids. Because its complexity may make the fully optimal mechanism too costly to implement, I also study the optimal mechanisms in restricted classes. The most restrictive are pure calendar mechanisms, which alloc...
-
作者：Leduc, Matt V.; Jackson, Matthew O.; Johari, Ramesh
作者单位：Stanford University; Stanford University; International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA); Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：When a new product or technology is introduced, potential consumers can learn its quality by trying it, at a risk, or by letting others try it and free-riding on the information that they generate. We propose a dynamic game to study the adoption of technologies of uncertain value, when agents are connected by a network and a monopolist seller chooses a profit maximizing policy. Consumers with low degree (few friends) have incentives to adopt early, while consumers with high degree have incenti...
-
作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Choi, Syngjoo; Kim, Jinwoo
作者单位：Columbia University; Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：We study the Generalized Second Price auctions a standard method for allocating online search advertising experimentally, considering both the static environment assumed by the prevailing theory and a dynamic game capturing the salient aspects of real-world search advertising auctions. Subjects of our experiment bid consistently with the leading equilibrium notions, but exhibit significant overbidding relative to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcome favored as an equilibrium selection in th...
-
作者：Leo, Greg
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：Two individuals face a regular task that requires the effort of only one. They take turns but sometimes arrange to swap obligations. These swaps account for their changing, private costs. While seemingly primitive, flexible turn-taking is surprisingly efficient, even relative to what can be achieved by mechanisms using monetary transfers. I model and experimentally evaluate a simple form of flexible turn-taking and then present a second form that is both consistent with patterns of subject beh...
-
作者：Boosey, Luke; Brookins, Philip; Ryvkin, Dmitry
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Max Planck Society
摘要：In many contest situations, the number of participants is not observable at the time of investment. We design a laboratory experiment to study individual behavior in Tullock (lottery) contests with group size uncertainty. There is a fixed pool of n potential players, each with independent probability q is an element of (0, 1] of participating. We independently manipulate each of the parameters and test the implied comparative statics predictions. Our results provide considerable support for th...
-
作者：Ben-Zwi, Oren
作者单位：University of Haifa
摘要：We introduce a novel characterization of all Walrasian price vectors in terms of over- and under demanded sets for monotone gross substitute combinatorial auctions. For ascending and descending auctions we suggest a universal framework for finding the minimum or maximum Walrasian price vectors for monotone gross substitute combinatorial auctions. An ascending (descending) auction is guaranteed to find the minimum (maximum) Walrasian if and only if it follows the suggested framework. (C) 2017 E...
-
作者：Brett, Craig; Weymark, John A.
作者单位：Mount Allison University; Vanderbilt University
摘要：Majority voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules proposed by a continuum of individuals who have quasilinear-in-consumption preferences is considered. Men (2012) has shown that individual preferences over these schedules are single-peaked. In this article, a complete characterization of selfishly optimal schedules is provided. Each selfishly optimal schedule has a bunching region in a neighborhood of the proposer's skill type, coincides with the maxi-max schedule below thi...
-
作者：Chen, Yan; Palfrey, Thomas R.
-
作者：de Castro, Luciano I.; Liu, Zhiwei; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
作者单位：University of Iowa; Capital University of Economics & Business
摘要：We introduce the idea of implementation under ambiguity. In particular, we study maximin efficient notions for an ambiguous asymmetric information economy (i.e., economies where agents' preferences are maximin a to Wald, 1950). The interest on the maximin preferences lies in the fact that maximin efficient allocations are always incentive compatible (de Castro and Yannelis, 2009), a result which is false with Bayesian preferences. A noncooperative notion called maximin equilibrium is introduce...
