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作者：Gentry, Matthew; Li, Tong; Lu, Jingfeng
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Vanderbilt University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We consider auctions with entry based on a general analytical framework we call the Arbitrarily Selective (AS) model. We characterize symmetric equilibrium in a broad class of standard auctions within this framework, in the process extending the classic revenue equivalence results of Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Levin and Smith (1994) to environments with endogenous and arbitrarily selective entry. We also explore the relationship between revenue maximization and efficiency, ...
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作者：Gelder, Alan; Kovenock, Dan
作者单位：Chapman University System; Chapman University
摘要：In a dynamic contest where it is costly to compete, a player who is behind must decide whether to surrender or keep fighting in the face of bleak odds. We experimentally examine the game theoretic prediction of last stand behavior in a multi-battle contest with a winning prize and losing penalty, as well as the contrasting prediction of surrendering in the corresponding contest with no penalty. We find varied evidence in support of these hypotheses in the aggregate data, but more conclusive ev...
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作者：Kajackaite, Agne; Gneezy, Uri
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Amsterdam
摘要：We study how cheating behavior is affected by incentives. After replicating the finding in the cheating game literature that lying does not increase with incentives, we show that this insensitivity is not a characteristic of the intrinsic lying cost, but rather a result of concern about being exposed as a liar. In a modified mind game in which this concern is eliminated, we find that people lie more, and in particular lie more when the incentives to do so increase. Thus, our results show that ...
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作者：Casella, Alessandra; Laslier, Jean-Francois; Mace, Antonin
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：In polarized committees, majority voting disenfranchises the minority. Allowing voters to spend freely a fixed budget of votes over multiple issues restores some minority power. However, it also creates a complex strategic scenario: a hide-and-seek game between majority and minority voters that corresponds to a decentralized version of the Colonel Blotto game. We offer theoretical results and bring the game to the laboratory. The minority wins as frequently as theory predicts, despite subjects...
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作者：Ederer, Florian; Stremitzer, Alexander
作者单位：Yale University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We investigate why people keep their promises in the absence of external enforcement mechanisms and reputational effects. In a controlled laboratory experiment we show that exogenous variation of second-order expectations (promisors' expectations about promisees' expectations) leads to a significant change in promisor behavior. We provide evidence that a promisor's aversion to disappointing a promisee's expectation leads her to behave more generously. We propose and estimate a simple model of ...
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作者：Muto, Nozomu; Sato, Shin
作者单位：Yokohama National University; Fukuoka University
摘要：We introduce a new axiom called bounded response, which states that for each smallest change of a preference profile, the change in the social choice must be smallest, if any, for the agent who induces the change in the preference profile. We show that bounded response is weaker than strategy-proofness, and that bounded response and efficiency imply dictatorship. This impossibility has a far-reaching negative implication: on the universal domain of preferences, it is difficult to identify a no...
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作者：Dutting, Paul; Talgam-Cohen, Inbal; Roughgarden, Tim
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Stanford University
摘要：Designing double auctions is a complex problem, especially when there are restrictions on the sets of buyers and sellers that may trade with one another. The goal of this paper is to develop a modular approach to the design of double auctions, by relating it to the exhaustively-studied problem of designing one-sided mechanisms with a single seller (or, alternatively, a single buyer). We consider several desirable properties of a double auction: feasibility, dominant-strategy incentive compatib...
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作者：Long, Yan; Mishra, Debasis; Sharma, Tridib
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：In the private values single object auction model, we construct a satisfactory mechanism - a symmetric, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and budget-balanced mechanism. The mechanism converges to efficiency at an exponential rate. It allocates the object to the highest valued agent with more than 99% probability provided there are at least 14 agents. It is also ex-post individually rational. We show that our mechanism is optimal in a restricted class of satisfactory ranking mechanisms. S...
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作者：Kadam, Sangram Vilasrao
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We prove that the unilateral substitutability property introduced in Hatfield and Kojima (2010) implies the substitutable completability property from Hatfield and Kominers (2014). This paper provides a novel linkage between these two sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable matching in many-to-one matching markets with contracts. A substitutable completion of a preference is a substitutable preference created by adding some sets of contracts to the original preference order. We pro...
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作者：Wu, Jiabin
作者单位：University of Oregon
摘要：This paper argues that political institutions play an important role in influencing the evolution of character traits. We consider a population with two groups each with different character traits. A political institution provides the platform and a set of rules for the two groups to battle over the relative representativeness of their traits for the high positions in the social hierarchy. This political process affects the economic outcomes of the two groups and, subsequently their character ...
