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作者：Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Ritzberger, Klaus
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：In finite games subgame perfect equilibria are precisely those that are obtained by a backwards induction procedure. In large extensive form games with perfect information this equivalence does not hold: Strategy combinations fulfilling the backwards induction criterion may not be subgame perfect in general. The full equivalence is restored only under additional (topological) assumptions. This equivalence is in the form of a one-shot deviation principle for large games, which requires lower se...
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作者：Tarbush, Bassel; Teytelboym, Alexander
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：We present a dynamic model of social network formation in which a fixed number of agents interact in overlapping social groups. We derive several results on the formation of links in such networks, including results on the degree distribution, on comparative statics relating degree and group size, and on the dynamics of homophily. In particular, we derive comparative statics showing that degree is typically positively related to social group size but negatively related to the size of the overl...
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作者：Anderlini, Luca; Terlizzese, Daniele
作者单位：Georgetown University; European Central Bank; Bank of Italy
摘要：Trusting beliefs can be exploited. A trustful player who is cheated too often, should start trusting less, until her beliefs are correct. For this reason we model trust as an equilibrium phenomenon. Receivers of an offer to transact choose whether or not to cheat. Cheating entails a cost, with an idiosyncratic component and a socially determined one, decreasing with the mass of players who cheat. The model either has a unique equilibrium level of trust (the proportion of transactions not cheat...
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作者：Afacan, Mustafa Oguz
作者单位：Sabanci University
摘要：We investigate extension/resource monotonicity and respecting improvements properties of the cumulative offer process (COP). Extension monotonicity says that no doctor is to be better off whenever others start preferring more contracts to being unmatched. Resource monotonicity, on the other hand, requires that no doctor becomes worse off whenever hospitals start hiring more doctors. The COP becomes extension and resource monotonic whenever contracts are unilateral substitutes (US) satisfying a...
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作者：Platz, Trine Tornoe; Osterdal, Lars Peter
作者单位：University of Southern Denmark; Copenhagen Business School
摘要：We consider a game in which a large number of identical agents choose when to queue up at a single server after it opens. Agents are impatient for service and also incur a cost proportional to time spent in the queue. We show that the first-in-first-out queue discipline and the last-in-first-out queue discipline both lead to a unique equilibrium arrival distribution. However, among all work-conserving queue disciplines, the first-in-first-out performs the worst in terms of equilibrium utility ...
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作者：Goeree, Jacob K.; Holt, Charles A.; Smith, Angela M.
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Cologne; University of Virginia; James Madison University
摘要：In a volunteer's dilemma, only one volunteer is needed to obtain a benefit for all. Volunteering is costly, and the symmetric Nash equilibrium involves randomization. These predictions have the intuitive property that volunteer rates decline with larger groups, but surprisingly, the probability of obtaining no volunteers is increasing with group size, even as the number of players goes to infinity. These predictions are evaluated in a laboratory experiment with a range of group sizes. Observed...
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作者：Harless, Patrick
作者单位：University of Glasgow
摘要：When rationing a resource or adjudicating conflicting claims, the arrival of new agents necessitates revision. Adopting a worst-case perspective, we introduce guarantee structures to measure the protection a rule provides to either individuals or groups in these circumstances. With the goal of maximizing guarantees for those in the original group, we characterize the constrained equal awards rule. Requiring that a rule provide protection for both the original and arriving agents, so that both ...
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作者：Drugov, Mikhail; Ryvkin, Dmitry
作者单位：New Economic School; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：In a biased contest, one of the players has an advantage in the winner determination process. We characterize a novel class of biased contest success functions pertaining to such contests and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for zero bias to be a critical point of arbitrary objectives satisfying certain symmetry restrictions. We, however, challenge the common wisdom that unbiased contests are always optimal when contestants are symmetric ex ante or even ex post. We show that contest...
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作者：Krajbich, Ian; Camerer, Colin; Rangel, Antonio
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; California Institute of Technology; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：A basic goal in mechanism design is to construct mechanisms that simultaneously satisfy efficiency, voluntary participation, and dominant strategy incentive compatibility. Previous work has shown that this is impossible, unless the agents and planner have sufficient information about each other and common knowledge. These results have remained largely theoretical because the required information is generally not available in practical applications. However, recent work has shown that these lim...
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作者：Palfrey, Thomas; Rosenthal, Howard; Roy, Nilanjan
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; New York University; City University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper uses a Bayesian mechanism design approach to investigate the effects of communication in a threshold public goods game. Individuals have private information about contribution costs. Individuals can each make a discrete contribution. If the number of contributors is at least equal to the threshold, a public benefit accrues to all members of the group. We experimentally implement three different communication structures prior to the decision move: (a) simultaneous exchange of binary ...
