Matching and chatting: An experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ding, Tingting; Schotter, Andrew
• 署名单位: Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; New York University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.004
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 94-115
• 关键词: School choice; matching; mechanism design; networks; Chat

摘要

While, in theory, the school matching problem is a static non-cooperative one-shot game, in reality the matching game is played by parents who choose their strategies after consulting or chatting with other parents in their social networks. In this paper we compare the performance of the Boston and the Gale-Shapley mechanisms in the presence of chatting through social networks. Our results indicate that allowing subjects to chat has an important impact on the likelihood that subjects change their strategies and also on the welfare and stability of the outcomes determined by the mechanism. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.