Evaluationwise strategy-proofness

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Erdamar, Bora; Sanver, M. Remzi; Sato, Shin
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Information Sciences & Technologies (INS2I); Fukuoka University; Bahcesehir University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.010
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 227-238
• 关键词: Approval voting; EFFICIENCY; Evaluationwise strategy-proofness; Preference-approval; strategy-proofness

摘要

We consider manipulation of collective decision making rules in a framework where voters not only rank candidates but also evaluate them as acceptable or unacceptable. In this richer informational setting, we adopt a new notion of strategy-proofness, called evaluationwise strategy-proofness, where incentives of manipulation exist if and only if a voter can replace an outcome which he finds unacceptable with an acceptable one. Evaluationwise strategy-proofness is weaker than strategy-proofness. However, we establish the prevalence of a logical incompatibility between evaluationwise strategy-proofness, anonymity and efficiency. On the other hand, we show possibility results when either anonymity or efficiency is weakened. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.