Sequential versus static screening: An equivalence result

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kraehmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; Humboldt University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.015
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 317-328
• 关键词: Sequential screening; Static screening; Stochastic mechanisms

摘要

We show that every sequential screening model is equivalent to a standard text book static screening model. We use this result and apply well-established techniques from static screening to obtain solutions for classes of sequential screening models for which standard sequential screening techniques are not applicable. Moreover, we identify the counterparts of well-understood features of the static screening model in the corresponding sequential screening model such as the single-crossing condition and conditions that imply the optimality of deterministic schedules. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.