Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gentzkow, Matthew; Kamenica, Emir
• 署名单位: Stanford University; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.004
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 411-429
• 关键词: communication; collusion; Information revelation

摘要

A number of senders with no ex ante private information publicly choose signals whose realizations they observe privately. Senders then convey verifiable messages about their signal realizations to a receiver who takes a non-contractible action that affects the welfare of all players. The space of available signals includes all conditional distributions of signal realizations and allows any sender to choose a signal that is arbitrarily correlated with signals of others. We characterize the information revealed in pure-strategy equilibria and show that greater competition tends to increase the amount of information revealed. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.