Modes of ambiguous communication

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kellner, Christian; Le Quement, Mark T.
• 署名单位: University of Southampton; University of East Anglia
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.010
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 271-292
• 关键词: Cheap talk; ambiguity

摘要

We study cheap talk communication in a simple two actions-two states model featuring an ambiguous state distribution. Equilibrium behavior of both sender (S) and receiver (R) features mixing and we relate each agent's randomization to a specific mode of ambiguous communication. For sufficiently high ambiguity, implementing the S-optimal decision rule with only two messages is impossible if R has aligned preferences. This may in contrast be possible if R has misaligned preferences. Adding a little ambiguity may generate influential communication that is unambiguously advantageous to S. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.