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作者：Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Meshalkin, Andrey; Predtetchinski, Arkadi
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We study strategies with one-period recall in the context of a general class of multilateral bargaining games. A strategy has one-period recall if actions in a particular period are only conditioned on information in the previous and the current period. We show that if players are sufficiently patient, given any proposal in the space of possible agreements, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium such that the given proposal is made and unanimously accepted in period zero. As a corollary we...
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作者：Dufwenberg, Martin; Servatka, Maros; Vadovic, Radovan
作者单位：University of Arizona; University of Gothenburg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Carleton University
摘要：We develop, and experimentally test, models of informal agreements. Agents are assumed to be honest but suffer costs of overcoming temptations. We extend two classical bargaining solutions - split-the-difference and deal-me-out - to this informal agreement setting. For each solution there are two natural ways to do this, leaving us with 2 x 2 models to explore. In the experiment, a temptations-constrained version of deal-me-out emerges as the clear winner. (c) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights res...
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作者：Hahn, Volker
作者单位：University of Konstanz
摘要：We analyze different committee designs in a model with the endogenous participation of experts who have private information about their own abilities. Each committee design involves a test of abilities whose accuracy influences experts' decisions to participate. We derive the following findings. First, higher wages continuously lower the quality of experts on the committee. Second, and as a consequence of this, optimal committees involve low wages. Third, an increase in transparency improves t...
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作者：Keser, Claudia; Markstaedter, Andreas; Schmidt, Martin
作者单位：University of Gottingen; Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
摘要：In a public-good experiment with heterogeneous endowments, we investigate if and how the contribution level as well as the previously observed fair-share rule of equal contributions relative to one's endowment (Hofmeyr et al., 2007; Keser et al., 2014) are influenced by minimum-contribution requirements. We consider three different schedules: FixMin, requiring the same absolute contributions, RelMin, requiring the same relative contributions, and ProgMin, requiring minimum contributions that p...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Tennenholtz, Moshe
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We consider an extensive-form game in which players have the option to commit to actions before the game is played. We focus on commitment procedures where players make voluntary irreversible commitments in a prescribed order over the decision nodes. We study whether such commitment procedures may lead to Pareto-efficient outcomes. Our main result is surprisingly positive: for two-player games, we introduce an order over the decision nodes for which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outco...
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作者：Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael; Ponti, Giovanni
作者单位：Middlesex University; Universitat d'Alacant; University of Chicago; Luiss Guido Carli University
摘要：We design an intertemporal Dictator Game to test whether Dictators modify their discounting behavior when their own decision is imposed on their matched Recipients. We run four different treatments to identify the effect of payoffs externalities from those related to information and beliefs. Our descriptive statistics show that Dictators display a marked propensity to account for the intertemporal preferences of Recipients, both in the presence of externalities (social motives) and/or when the...
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作者：Mukherjee, Saptarshi; Muto, Nozomu; Ramaekers, Eve
作者单位：Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Delhi; Yokohama National University; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：We consider implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms. We provide a complete characterization of the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable when agents are partially honest, in the sense that they have strict preferences for being sincere when truthfulness does not result in a worse outcome. As an application, we show that the Pareto correspondence is implemented by a finite mechanism. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kirkegaard, Rene
作者单位：University of Guelph
摘要：The spanning condition describes a situation where the agent's effort determines the weights placed on two distinct technologies. Sufficient conditions are known under which the first-order approach (FOA) is valid when the spanning condition holds. In this paper, a complete solution to the problem is provided. Thus, the problem is solved even when the FOA is not valid. The solution has two main steps. The first step fully characterizes the set of implementable actions. The second step establis...
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作者：Kusterer, David J.; Schmitz, Patrick W.
作者单位：University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We report data from a laboratory experiment with 576 participants that was designed to test Aghion and Tirole's (1994a) management of innovation theory which is based on the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights approach. A research unit and a customer can invest to increase the probability of making an innovation. When the innovation is made, the parties bargain over the division of the revenue. In line with the theoretical predictions, we find that ownership matters for the division of the rev...
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作者：Renault, Jerome; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas
作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Toulouse School of Economics; Tel Aviv University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We study a dynamic model of information provision. A state of nature evolves according to a Markov chain. An advisor with commitment power decides how much information to provide to an uninformed decision maker, so as to influence his short-term decisions. We deal with a stylized class of situations, in which the decision maker has a risky action and a safe action, and the payoff to the advisor only depends on the action chosen by the decision maker. The greedy disclosure policy is the policy ...
