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作者：Kalai, Ehud; Battaglini, Marco; Charness, Gary; Crawford, Vincent; Forges, Francoise; Parkes, David; Byrd, Jennifer; Milnor, John; Arrow, Kenneth J.; Aumann, Robert J.; Dixit, Avinash K.; Dubey, Pradeep; Maskin, Eric; Meltzer, Herbert Y.; Myerson, Roger; Roth, Alvin E.; Shubik, Martin; Smith, Vernon L.; Spence, Mike; Sudderth, Bill; Valenciano, Federico
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Stanford University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Princeton University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Northwestern University; Harvard University; Northwestern University; Feinberg School of Medicine; University of Chicago; Stanford University; Yale University; Chapman University System; Chapman University; New York University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Basque Country
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作者：Cason, Timothy N.; Zubrickas, Robertas
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Bath
摘要：The provision point mechanism as a method of funding threshold public goods is extended with refund bonuses. Each contributor not only has his contribution refunded in the case of insufficient contributions but also receives a refund bonus proportional to his proposed contribution. As long as the refund bonus pool does not exceed the net value of the public good, in equilibrium the public good is always provided and refund bonuses are never distributed. In this paper, we empirically investigat...
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作者：Healy, Paul J.; Jain, Ritesh
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：Groves and Ledyard (1977) construct a mechanism for public goods procurement that can be viewed as a direct-revelation Groves mechanism in which agents announce a parameter of a quadratic approximation of their true preferences. The mechanism's Nash equilibrium outcomes are efficient. The budget is balanced because Groves mechanisms are balanced for the announced quadratic preferences. Tian (1996) subsequently discovered a richer set of budget-balancing preferences. We replicate the Groves-Led...
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作者：Van Essen, Matthew; Walker, Mark
作者单位：University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; University of Arizona
摘要：We argue that since allocation mechanisms will not always be in equilibrium, their out-of-equilibrium properties must be taken into account along with their properties in equilibrium. For economies with public goods, we define a simple market-like mechanism in which the strong Nash equilibria yield the Lindahl allocations and prices. The mechanism satisfies critical out-of-equilibrium desiderata that previously-introduced mechanisms fail to satisfy, and always (weakly) yields Pareto improvemen...
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作者：Buisseret, Peter
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：I study electoral competition between established parties under threat of entry by a challenger under non-majoritarian run-off elections. In contrast with classical majoritarian run-off elections, I show how non-majoritarian rules can facilitate two-party systems, including those in which the established parties deter the challenger's entry by adopting differentiated platforms. I also show that non-majoritarian run-off rules may facilitate entry deterrence by established parties in settings wh...
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作者：Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Sang-Hyun
作者单位：University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia; Yonsei University
摘要：We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights re...
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作者：Gottardi, Piero; Talton, Jean Marc; Ghirardato, Paolo
作者单位：European University Institute; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; University of Turin
摘要：This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents, that is of adopting flexible contracts, relative to the use of rigid, non-discretionary contracts. The main focus of the paper lies in the analysis of the costs of delegation, primarily agency costs, versus their benefits, primarily the flexibility of the action choice in two different environments, one with risk and one with ambiguity. We first determine and characterize the properties of the opti...
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作者：Bergantinos, Gustavo; Gonzalez-Diaz, Julio; Gonzalez-Rueda, Angel M.; Fernandez de Cordoba, Maria P.
作者单位：Universidade de Vigo; Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
摘要：In this paper we study a cost allocation problem that is inherent to most energy networks: the allocation of losses. In particular, we study how to allocate gas losses between haulers in gas transmission networks. We discuss four allocation rules, two of them have already been in place in real networks and two others that are defined for the first time in this paper. We then present a comparative analysis of the different rules by studying their behavior with respect to a set of principles set...
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作者：Arzumanyan, Mariam; Polborn, Mattias K.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We analyze a costly voting model with multiple candidates under plurality rule. In equilibrium, the set of candidates is partitioned into a set of relevant candidates (which contains at least two candidates) and the remaining candidates. All relevant candidates receive votes and have an equal chance of winning, independent of their popular support levels. The remaining candidates do not receive any votes. Furthermore, all voters who cast votes do so for their most preferred candidate, i.e., th...
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作者：De, Anindya; Diakonikolas, Ilias; Servedio, Rocco A.
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Southern California; Columbia University
摘要：For f a weighted voting scheme used by n voters to choose between two candidates, the n Shapley-Shubik Indices (or Shapley values) of f measure how much control each voter can exert over the overall outcome. The Inverse Shapley Value Problem is the problem of designing a weighted voting scheme which (approximately) achieves a desired input vector of values for the Shapley-Shubik indices. We give the first efficient algorithm with provable guarantees for the Inverse Shapley Value Problem. For a...
