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作者：Ching, S; Serizawa, S
作者单位：Shiga University of Medical Science; University of Osaka
摘要：In a recent paper, Sprumont (1991, Econometrica 59, 509-519) showed that the uniform rule (Benassy, 1982, The Economics of Market Disequilibrium, Academic Press, 1982) is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity, and efficiency on the single-peaked domain (Black, 1948, J. Polit. Econ. 56, 23-34). This result motivates us to investigate whether there is a larger domain on which there exists a nontrivial strategy-proof rule. We want such a domain to be as large as possible. We show...
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作者：Cressman, R; Schlag, KH
作者单位：Wilfrid Laurier University; University of Bonn
摘要：The evolutionary basis for predicting the backwards induction solution in finite extensive-form games with perfect information is examined. Evolution is modelled using the replicator dynamic in combination with rare perturbations that introduce a small change in the proportion of each strategy. The criterion for our judgement is whether this dynamic stabilizes over time at the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. We find that the backwards induction solution is fully justified by this process ...
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作者：Chari, VV; Christiano, LJ; Eichelbaum, M
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Northwestern University; Federal Reserve System - USA; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a dynamic model with optimizing private agents and a benevolent, optimizing monetary authority that cannot commit to future policies. We characterize the set of sustainable equilibria and discuss the implications for institutional reform. We show that there are equilibria in which the monetary authority pursues inflationary policies because that is what private agents expect. We call such equilibria expectation traps. Alternative institutional arrangements for the conduct of monetar...
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作者：DeMarzo, P; Skiadas, C
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Northwestern University
摘要：We identify and analyze a class of economies with asymmetric information that we call quasi-complete. For quasi-complete economies we determine equilibrium trades, show that the set of fully informative equilibria is a singleton, and give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partially informative equilibria. Besides unifying some familiar settings, such as those of Grossman (1976) and Milgrom and Stokey (1982), the following new results are proved: (a) The same restrictions...
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作者：Bisin, A
作者单位：New York University
摘要：The present paper studies a class of general equilibrium economies with imperfectly competitive financial intermediaries and price-taking consumers. Intermediaries optimally choose the securities they issue and the bid-ask spread they charge. Financial intermediation is costly, and hence markets are endogenously incomplete. An appropriate equilibrium concept is developed, and existence is proved. Competitive equilibria for this class of economies display full indexation of securities payoffs a...
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作者：Rajan, U
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：The Bayesian approach to game theory is extended to a setting where players can believe that other players may tremble with infinitesimal probability. Here too, a player's type induces a probability distribution over Ether players' types. Two axioms of near rationality are introduced. Almost common knowledge of near rationality implies a strategy choice that survives one round of weak dominance followed by iterated strict dominance. Common knowledge of hierarchical rationality leads to iterate...
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作者：Konishi, H; Le Breton, M; Weber, S
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; Institut Universitaire de France
摘要：This paper examines the existence of a noncooperative equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy where consumers have quasi-linear preferences. Jurisdictions consist of consumers who chose the same public project and finance the cost of production of public goods through either a proportional income tax or a poll tax. We show that under a proportional income tax scheme a Nash equilibria may fail to exist. Under a poll tax scheme an equilibrium always exists but, in general. Nash equili...
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作者：Boylan, RT
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：A new condition is shown to be necessary and sufficient for Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) implementation in environments with complete information. This result implies that all choice functions are CPNE-implementable when individuals' utility functions are bounded with respect to all variables-except for money-and are either analytic or quasi-linear. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Brusco, S
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：In auctions with correlated types it is possible to design mechanisms such that full surplus extraction can be obtained as the outcome of an equilibrium in which agents use (weakly) dominant strategies. However, it is not assured that the outcome is unique. We present an example in which no mechanism can yield the Full surplus extraction outcome as the unique Bayesian equilibrium outcome. Next we show that in the standard auction model the multiplicity problem can be fully resolved using seque...
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作者：Carrillo, JD
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：We analyze the gains of coordinating decisions in a regulatory Framework in which agents are sovereign and tax inducements are socially costly. We consider a general multi-agent situation with externalities among agents, incomplete information, and type-dependent reservation utilities. When the regulator (optimally) leaves informational rents to the most efficient agents, centralized coordination reduces global activity. Coordination induces more activity when the principal (optimally) leaves ...
