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作者：RUFF, LE
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
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作者：FELLNER, W
作者单位：Yale University
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作者：SEN, A; PATTANAIK, PK
作者单位：Harvard University
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作者：KURZ, M
作者单位：Stanford University
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作者：SATO, R
作者单位：Brown University
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作者：Kim, Kyungmin; Kos, Nenad
作者单位：Emory University; Bocconi University
摘要：We study design and pricing by a monopolist who has no information about the distribution of consumers' tastes and maximizes her profit under the worst-case scenario. We show that her optimal strategy takes a simple form of dividing the taste space into a finite number of equal-length intervals and serving consumers on a randomly chosen interval. We obtain this result by studying the dual problem of finding a distribution of consumers' tastes that minimizes the seller's profit and establishing...
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作者：Kimya, Mert
作者单位：University of Sydney
摘要：A credible set is the set of stable states of an expectation satisfying internal and external stability as defined in Dutta and Vohra (2017). We show that credible sets are characterized by two fundamental coalitional rationality axioms: basic coalitional rationality and farsighted rationality. Credible sets exist in a wide range of environments, including all finite games, and they provide a unifying framework for organizing prominent notions in the farsighted stability literature. Influentia...
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作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Laohakunakorn, Krittanai
作者单位：University of Surrey
摘要：We analyze a monopoly pricing model where information about the buyer's valuation is endogenous. Before the seller sets a price, both the buyer and the seller receive private signals that may be informative about the buyer's valuation. The joint distribution of these signals, as a function of the valuation, is optimally chosen by the players. In general, players have conflicting incentives over the provision of information. As a modelling device, we assume that an aggregation function determin...
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作者：Guasoni, Paolo; Weber, Marko Hans
作者单位：Dublin City University; University of Bologna; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper examines the implications of unhedgeable fundamental risk, combined with agents' heterogeneous preferences and wealth allocations, on dynamic asset pricing and portfolio choice. We solve in closed form a continuous-time general equilibrium model in which unhedgeable fundamental risk affects aggregate consumption dynamics, rendering the market incomplete. Several long-lived agents with heterogeneous risk-aversion and time-preference make consumption and investment decisions, trading ...
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作者：Muramoto, Akitoshi; Sogo, Takeharu
作者单位：University of Osaka; SKEMA Business School; Universite Cote d'Azur
摘要：We study optimal auctions with expectation-based loss-averse bidders. For ex-ante identical bidders, we establish sufficient conditions under which optimal mechanisms must be asymmetric. While symmetric designs are optimal for bidders with expected-utility preferences, we show that if the degree of loss aversion is sufficiently large relative to valuation variation, a one-bidder optimal design (an extreme form of asymmetry) yields higher expected revenue than any symmetric design with multiple...
