Trembles in the Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Rajan, U
署名单位：
Carnegie Mellon University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1998.2416
发表日期：
1998
页码：
248-266
关键词：
摘要：
The Bayesian approach to game theory is extended to a setting where players can believe that other players may tremble with infinitesimal probability. Here too, a player's type induces a probability distribution over Ether players' types. Two axioms of near rationality are introduced. Almost common knowledge of near rationality implies a strategy choice that survives one round of weak dominance followed by iterated strict dominance. Common knowledge of hierarchical rationality leads to iterated weak dominance. Perfect equilibria result from knowledge of near rationality and of other players' beliefs. To attain proper equilibria, a stronger hierarchical restriction on beliefs is necessary. (C) 1998 Academic Press.