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作者：Cellini, R; Lambertini, L
作者单位：University of Bologna
摘要：We consider a dynamic model of differentiated oligopoly with capital accumulation. We prove that the model may converge to either a steady state replicating the optimum of the static problem, or a steady state driven by capital accumulation alone. In the latter case, the same steady state equilibrium is observed under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, as well as social planning. Journal of Economic Literature Classifications Numbers: C73, L13. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Keister, T
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico
摘要：This paper examines the impact monetary redistribution policies have on the amount of sunspot-induced volatility in an economy. A dynamic model of segmented asset markets is presented in which the tax-transfer policy determines, in a continuous way, the influence sunspots can have on the general price level and on consumption. If the policy leads to a transfer of resources across segmentation lines, there exist equilibria in which sunspots affect consumption. The primary result is that there i...
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作者：Marinacci, M
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：The standard criterion used to compare streams of payoffs in the undiscounted case is lim inf(T --> infinity) 1/T Sigma(t = 1)(T) u(x(t)). In this paper we approach the problem axiomatically. This sheds light on the behavioral underpinnings of such a rule and leads to a novel choice criterion, the Polya Index. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D90. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Li, YT; Wright, R
作者单位：National Tsing Hua University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study government transaction policies in search-theoretic models of money. We model government as a subset of agents, who are subject to the same random matching technology and other constraints as private agents, but who behave in an exogenous way regarding which objects they accept in trade and at what price. The objective is to see how these policies affect private agents' strategics, and hence the set of equilibria. We analyze how the effects depend on factors like the size of governmen...
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作者：Amigues, JP; Favard, P; Gaudet, G; Moreaux, M
作者单位：INRAE; Universite de Toulouse; Universite de Toulouse; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Toulouse
摘要：Consider a general equilibrium framework where the marginal cost of extraction from several deposits of an exhaustible resource is constant in terms of an inexhaustible perfect substitute, and that this cost differs between deposits. The instantaneous rate of production from the inexhaustible resource is subject to a capacity constraint. We show, under standard assumptions, that not only may it be optimal to begin using a high cost resource before a lower cost one is depleted, as shown in Kemp...
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作者：Cazzavillan, G; Lloyd-Braga, T; Pintus, PA
作者单位：Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Universidade Catolica Portuguesa; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：The purpose of this paper is to study the influence of the elasticity of capital-labor substitution and of the labor supply elasticity on the existence of multiple Pareto-ranked stationary equilibria, local indeterminacy, bifurcations, and expectations-driven fluctuations in economies with external and internal increasing returns to scale in production. This is done through general geometrical methods that do not depend upon particular specifications for preferences and technology. For the sak...
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作者：Baliga, S; Corchon, LC; Sjostrom, T
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Harvard University
摘要：In this paper we study a situation where the planner cannot commit to a mechanism and the outcome Function is substituted by the planner herself. We assume (i) agents have complete information and play simultaneously and (ii) given the messages announced by the agents, the planner reacts in an optimal way given her beliefs. This transforms the implementation problem into a signaling game. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for interactive implementation under different restrictions ...
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作者：Ghirardato, P
摘要：An important technical question arising in economic and financial applications of decision models with non-additive beliefs is how to define stochastic independence. In fact the straightforward generalization of independence does not in general yield a unique product. I discuss the problem of independence, with specific focus on the validity of the Fubini theorem. The latter holds in general only for a special class of functions. It also requires a stronger notion of independent product. This ...
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作者：Dutta, J; Morris, S
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：At a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE), individuals are assumed to know the map from states to prices. This hypothesis has two components, that agents agree (consensus) and that they have point expectations (degeneracy). We consider economies where agents' beliefs are described by a joint distribution on states and prices, and these beliefs are fulfilled at equilibrium. Beliefs are self-fulfilling if every price in the support of the distribution is an equilibrium price. The correspondin...
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作者：Miller, NH
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper examines deterministic partnerships where a single partner observes the actions taken by a subset of the other partners and issues a report conditional on that observation. No other partner has any additional information. In such a model, whenever the observing partner can see the action chosen by at least one other partner, the efficient action vector can be sustained in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium by sharing rule that exhibits budget balance and limited liability. (C) 1997 Acad...
