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作者：Lopomo, G
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; New York University
摘要：With private and affiliated buyer's values, the English auction maximizes the seller's expected profit within a large family of sequential bidding mechanisms, named Simple Sequential Auctions. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Bergin, J; Sen, A
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We study the implementation of social choice rules in incomplete information environments. A sufficiency condition called posterior reversal is given for extensive form implementation. The condition has a natural interpretation in signaling terms: Consistent posterior distributions under truth-telling are different from consistent posteriors under deception. This variation in the distribution over player types leads to variation in the distribution over actions and outcomes (comparing truth-te...
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作者：Phelan, C
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper analyzes the effects of moral hazard on long-run consumption or utility. Given exponential utility, it is shown that the utility of those with unobservable endowments becomes arbitrarily negative as long as any positive fraction of otherwise identical agents have observable endowments. Next, it is shown that assuming a finite number of agents results in essentially the same outcomes as with a continuum of agents. Finally, it is shown that the key characteristic determining whether t...
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作者：Crawford, V
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper is a survey of experimental evidence on behavior in ames with communication focusing on environments where talk is cheap in the sense that players' messages have no direct payoff implications. Also considered are some environments in which communication was permitted throughout the game, in addition to those environments in which only preplay communication was allowed. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Levine, DK; Martinelli, C
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：A long-run player, with private information about how long the game will last, must precommit to an action and faces a sequence of short-run players who get a noisy signal of that action. Since noise vanishes with time, we might expect a long-lived long-run player to behave as a Stackelberg leader. If so, short-run players may end up ignoring the signal. Then, however, the long-run player would have no reason to actually choose the Stackelberg action. We show that this paradox can be resolved ...
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作者：Kim, SK; Wang, SS
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper studies the characteristics of optimal contracts when the agent is risk-averse in the double moral-hazard situation in which the principal also participates in the production process. It is already known that a simple linear contract is one of many optimal contracts under the double moral-hazard when the agent is risk-neutral. We find that the agent's optimal incentive scheme in this case is unique and non-linear, but less sensitive to output than would be designed under a single mo...
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作者：Chakravarty, SR
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS)
摘要：This paper considers the Debreu-Farrell-Fare measure of efficiency of merger to compare economic efficiencies of alternative merged entities in a homogeneous good industry. The comparability results rely on concentration curve dominance relation and identify the class of cost functions for which efficiency ranking of the entities becomes unambiguous. The results have been developed under alternative assumptions about the total output and number of firms of the merging subgroups. (C) 1998 Acade...
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作者：Chen, XH; White, H
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Recently macroeconomists and game theorists have dropped the mutual consistency assumption for rational expectations equilibrium (REE) or Nash equilibrium (NE), considering instead plausible adaptive agent learning behaviors yielding sensible REE or NE. But when agents do not have detailed knowledge of the relevant equilibrium relations, they can easily arrive at incorrect belief equilibria which are not rational and have no optimality properties [14]. REE and NE thus lose plausibility as outc...
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作者：Jovanovic, B; Ueda, M
作者单位：New York University; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We study a monetary system in which final goods sell on spot markets, while labor and dividends sell through contracts. Firms and workers confuse absolute and relative price changes: A positive price-level shock makes sellers think they are producing better goods than they really are. They split this apparent windfall with workers who get a higher real wage. Hence, unexpected inflation shifts real income from firms (the principals) to workers (the agents), and thereby lowers stock-returns. A p...
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作者：Aoyagi, M
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：This note presents a condition which guarantees the existence of a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism with budget balance when agents have quasi-linear utility functions. This condition requires correlation among agents' private signals (types), and is (1) simple and easy to verify, (2) good for any decision rule whether efficient or not, (3) valid even if agents' types are mutually payoff-relevant, and (4) true for almost every probability distribution of agents' types. (C) 1998 Academic...
