Expectation traps and discretion
成果类型：
Article; Proceedings Paper
署名作者：
Chari, VV; Christiano, LJ; Eichelbaum, M
署名单位：
University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Northwestern University; Federal Reserve System - USA; National Bureau of Economic Research
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1998.2421
发表日期：
1998
页码：
462-492
关键词：
摘要：
We develop a dynamic model with optimizing private agents and a benevolent, optimizing monetary authority that cannot commit to future policies. We characterize the set of sustainable equilibria and discuss the implications for institutional reform. We show that there are equilibria in which the monetary authority pursues inflationary policies because that is what private agents expect. We call such equilibria expectation traps. Alternative institutional arrangements for the conduct of monetary policy which impose limited forms of commitment on the policymaker can eliminate expectation traps. (C) 1998 Academic Press.