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作者：Kocherlakota, NR
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：This paper examines the sets of feasible allocations in a large class of economic environments in which commitment is impossible (following Myerson [8], the standard definition of feasibility is adapted to take account of the lack of commitment). The environments feature either memory or money. Memory is defined as knowledge on the part of an agent of the full histories of all agents with whom he has had direct or indirect contact in the past. Money is defined as an object that does not enter ...
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作者：Edlin, AS; Shannon, C
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Economists commonly seek to show that one variable increases in response to changes in another variable. This paper provides sufficient conditions to draw such strict monotone comparative statics conclusions in optimization problems with and without binding constraints. These results extend the lattice-theoretic results of Milgrom and Shannon [10] by imposing a stronger differential version of the single crossing property and arguing from first-order conditions. We illustrate the importance of...
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作者：Grandmont, JM; Pintus, P; de Vilder, R
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; CY Cergy Paris Universite; University of Amsterdam
摘要：We develop simple geometrical methods to study local indeterminacy, bifurcations, and stochastic (sunspot) equilibria near a steady state, in nonlinear two dimensional economic models. We present in particular a simple. constructive, geometrical characterization of the support of stochastic sunspot equilibria, not only arbitrarily near a steady state, but also along local bifurcations. These methods are applied to a simple aggregative model to study in particular the influence of capital-labor...
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作者：Marschak, T; Reichelstein, S
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Our model of network mechanisms studies individually addressed messages between any two members of an organization. For a given organizational objective function, wt examine communication costs, as measured by the number of message variables that agents need to exchange at equilibrium in order to achieve the desired action choices. Fur the class of objective functions we consider. price mechanisms are shown to minimize communication costs. IT cine requires the network tu be hierarchical, the o...
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作者：Shimoji, M; Watson, J
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We propose a notion of conditional dominance for games whose representations designate information sets. We prove that iterated conditional dominance is equivalent to extensive form rationalizability. We also conduct a general analysis of these concepts, yielding new insights on rationalizability and on the equivalence of solutions when applied to different representations of a game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C63, C72, C73. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Kocherlakota, N; Wallace, N
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We study a random-matching, absence-of-double-coinsidence environment in which people cannot precommit and in which there are two imperfect ways to keep track of what other people have done in the past: money and a public record of all past actions that is updated with an average lag. We study how the magnitude of that lag affects the allocations that are optimal from among allocations that are stationary and feasible and that satisfy incentive constraints which arise from the absence of commi...
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作者：Ben-Porath, E
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：Let P be a correlated equilibrium distribution on the set of outcomes of a fame G. Can P be implemented by some cheap pre-play procedure that does not involve a mediator? It is shown that if there are two distinct Nash equilibrium payoffs for each player in G and if P is rational (that is, consists of probabilities which are rational numbers) and generates for each player i an expected payoff which is above her worst Nash equilibrium payoff, then P can be virtually implemented in a sequential ...
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作者：Heifetz, A; Polemarchakis, HM
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：We exhibit a partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium, where no individual knows the state of the world or the quantities traded by any other individual. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Al-Najjar, NI
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：The paper develops a framework for factor analysis and arbitrage pricing in a large asset economy modeled as one with a continuum of assets. It is shown that the assumptions of absence of arbitrage opportunities and that returns have a strict Factor structure imply exact factor-pricing for a Full measure of assets. Interpreting finite subsets of assets as random draws from the underlying economy, there is probability one that every asset in a finite sample is exactly Factor-priced. It is furth...
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作者：Fiestras-Janeiro, G; Borm, P; van Megen, F
作者单位：Universidade de Vigo; Tilburg University; Tilburg University
摘要：This paper introduces the notions of protective and prudent equilibria in the context of finite games in strategic form. It turns out that for games both notions are in fact equivalent. Moreover, it is shown that for matrix games the set of protective equilibria equals the set of proper equilibria. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
