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作者：Banks, JS; Sundaram, RK
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; New York University
摘要：This paper studies the interaction between a single long-lived principal and a series of short-lived agents in the presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection. We assume that the principal can influence the agents' behavior only through her choice of a retention rule; this rule is Further required to be sequentially rational (i.e., no precommitment is allowed). We provide general conditions under which equilibria exist where (a) the principal adopts a cut-off rule under which agents ar...
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作者：Bhaskar, V
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：We analyze an evolutionary model with noisy pre-play communication, where the message received can differ from the message sent without the sender being aware of this. Noise implies that an inefficient strategy cannot push unsent messages, allowing these messages to be used by a mutant in order to coordinate upon an efficient outcome. This ensures that any neutrally stable strategy is efficient. Since noise restricts drift, we also have existence of evolutionarily stable sets in a larger class...
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作者：Huybens, E; Smith, BD
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We consider a small open economy with a costly state verification problem and binding reserve requirements. The presence of these frictions leads to the existence of two steady states with credit rationing. An increase in the money growth rate, the world interest rate or reserve requirements raises (lowers) GDP in the high (low) activity steady state. However, sufficiently large increases in money growth or the world interest rate can transform the high activity steady state from a sink to a s...
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作者：Karandikar, R; Mookherjee, D; Ray, D; Vega-Redondo, F
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Boston University; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：A 2 x 2 game is played repeatedly by two satisficing players. The game considered includes the Prisoner's Dilemma, as well as games of coordination and common interest. Each player has an aspiration at each date, and takes an action. The action is switched at the subsequent period only if the achieved payoff falls below aspirations; the switching probability depends on the shortfall. Aspirations are periodically updated according to payoff experience: but are occasionally subject to trembles. ...
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作者：Gossner, O
摘要：Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria are useful notions to understand the strategic effects of information and communication. Between these two models, a protocol generates information through communication. We define a secure protocol as a protocol from which no individual may have strategic incentives to deviate and characterize these protocols. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 072. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Alcalde, J; Perez-Castrillo, D; Romero-Medina, A
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We implement the stable correspondence of a job matching market in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. We use a simple sequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker (first stage) and, then, each worker accepts at most one proposal (second stage). Moreover, if agents preferences are additive, this mechanism implements in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium the firms' optimal correspondence when firms use undominated strategies. Finally, we construct another simple sequential mechanism wh...
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作者：Benhabib, J
作者单位：New York University
摘要：This introduction provides an overview of the three papers included in this symposium and highlights their contribution to the literature. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Binmore, K; Piccione, M; Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Southampton; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (MESSES) in Rubinstein's alternating-offers, infinite-horizon bargaining game. We show that a MESS causes agreement to be achieved immediately, with neither player willing to delay the agreement by one period in order to achieve the other player's share of the surplus. Each player's share of the surplus is then bounded between the shares received by the two players in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of Rubinstein's game....
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作者：Donaldson, D; Weymark, JA
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：We show that any quasiordering is the intersection of orderings. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Sandroni, A
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：A stage game is played for many periods. Each player maximizes discounted expected payoffs, given updated beliefs about opponent's strategies. For the case of infinitely repeated games, Kalai and Lehrer [8, 9] show that, under absolute continuity, rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium. Absolute continuity, however, does not ensure convergence to approximate Nash equilibrium play in games of long (but finite) horizon. I show that asymptotic continuity is equivalent to absolute continuity ...
