Unique implementation of the full surplus extraction outcome in auctions with correlated types
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Brusco, S
署名单位：
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1998.2392
发表日期：
1998
页码：
185-200
关键词：
摘要：
In auctions with correlated types it is possible to design mechanisms such that full surplus extraction can be obtained as the outcome of an equilibrium in which agents use (weakly) dominant strategies. However, it is not assured that the outcome is unique. We present an example in which no mechanism can yield the Full surplus extraction outcome as the unique Bayesian equilibrium outcome. Next we show that in the standard auction model the multiplicity problem can be fully resolved using sequential mechanisms, i.e., we show that it is possible to obtain the full surplus extraction outcome as the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. (C) 1998 Academic Press.