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作者：Campbell, CM
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We examine self-enforcing bidder coordination in auctions in which bidding is costly. Conditions on the distribution of valuations are identified that guarantee multiple equilibria. Under slightly stronger conditions, within the set of sunspot payoffs only those that are convex combinations of payoffs of extreme asymmetric equilibria are interim efficient for the bidders. If preplay communication is possible, every no-communication equilibrium payoff is interim Pareto-dominated for the bidders...
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作者：de Frutos, MA
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We consider the problem of cost sharing in the presence of increasing returns to scale and potential strategic behavior on the part of consumers. We show that any smooth and strictly monotonic mechanism for which a Nash equilibrium exists for all profiles of convex and monotonic preferences must be dictatorial. However, we propose a cost sharing mechanism, the decreasing serial mechanism, for which an interesting domain restriction ensures existence of a noncooperative equilibrium for its cost...
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作者：Vila, X
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：We examine Rubinstein's approach to decision making based on the use of similarity relations. More specifically, we show that any attempt to order bundles of three or more alternatives using similarity relations will generate intransitivities. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Oloriz, E; Candeal, JC; Indurain, E
作者单位：Universidad Publica de Navarra; University of Zaragoza
摘要：We obtain a full characterization of the representability of interval orders by a pair of real-valued functions. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Shitovitz, B; Spiegel, M
作者单位：University of Haifa
摘要：In this paper, we derive qualitative and asymptotic results on Cournot-Nash and Lindahl equilibria in pure public good economies. In a discrete finite economy with similar consumers (e.g., sharing the same Cobb-Douglas utility), we show that the consumer with the biggest initial endowment prefers the proportional Lindahl over his Cournot-Nash bundle. The asymptotic results are derived using a model of a mixed economy with an atomless sector of consumers as an idealization for economies with fe...
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作者：Goenka, A; Kelly, DL; Spear, SE
作者单位：University of Essex; University of Miami; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper examines an overlapping generations version of the Shapley-Shubik market game. We show existence of equilibria for the simple one commodity model and analyze the dynamics of the equilibrium trajectories generated in the model. Because of the non-linearities generated by strategic interaction of agents in the model, we find that complex and chaotic equilibrium dynamics are possible in this model for a much broader range of preferences than those for which Grandmont (Econometrica 53, ...
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作者：An, MY
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This paper provides a complete characterization of logconcavity, an increasingly popular concept in the economics of uncertainty and information. New and known results are proven without assuming that density functions are differentiable. A systematic comparison between logconcavity and logconvexity is made and the source of the asymmetries between the two is investigated. The key difference is that logconcavity is preserved under one-sided integrations regardless of the types of distribution ...
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作者：Jullien, B; Picard, P
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite Paris Nanterre
摘要：A two period monetary overlapping generations model with efficiency wages is constructed, in which the workers' effort is unobservable and wage contracts verify an incentive compatibility constraint to prevent shirking. Irs dynamics is similar ro the one of a market clearing neoclassical model driven by intertemporal substitution effects, in which the labour supply curve would be replaced by a nonshirking condition. But normative properties of macroeconomic policies differ. In particular emplo...
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作者：Coles, MG; Wright, R
作者单位：University of Essex; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper considers dynamic equilibria in a model with random matching. strategic bargaining, and money. Equilibrium in the bargaining game is characterized in terms of a simple differential equation. When we embed this characterization into the monetary economy, the model can generate outcomes such as limit cycles that never arise if one imposes a myopic Nash bargaining solution, as has been done in the past. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Rustichini, A
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：Several problems in economic theory can be formulated as a dynamic programming problem, plus an additional incentive compatibility constraint. This constraint requires the continuation value along the chosen sequence, at any point in time, to be larger than some prescribed Function of the state, the control, or perhaps both. This constraint changes the nature of the problem in a substantial way: for instance, even if the problem is discounted, standard arguments based on contraction principles...
