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作者：Balzer, Benjamin; Rosato, Antonio
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; University of Queensland; University of Naples Federico II
摘要：We analyze reserve prices in auctions with independent private values when bidders are expectations-based loss averse. We find that the optimal public reserve price excludes fewer bidder types than under risk neutrality. Moreover, we show that public reserve prices are not optimal as the seller can earn a higher revenue with mechanisms that better leverage the attachment effect. We discuss two such mechanisms: i) an auction with a secret and random reserve price, and ii) a mechanism where an a...
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作者：Lu, Zhuoran; Song, Yangbo
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
摘要：We study a team incentive design problem where multiple agents are located on a network and work on a joint project. The principal seeks the least costly mechanism to incentivize full effort, by choosing the work assignment sequence and the rewards to the agents upon success. Whereas the agents' actions are hidden to the principal, they may be observed among the agents given the internal information that is determined by the network and the sequence. Under effort complementarity, the transpare...
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作者：Mcclellan, Andrew
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：We study how a principal decides the duration of a project based on an agent's report about the growth rate of the project's profitability. The principal optimally commits to a project standard, shutting down whenever the project's profitability falls below the standard. Low-growth projects receive stationary standards, whereas high-growth projects receive standards that either increase unboundedly over time (with growing inefficiencies upon shut down), decrease towards the principal's first-b...
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作者：Fleurbaey, Marc; Zuber, Stephane
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：How can social prospects be evaluated and compared when there may be a risk on i) the actual allocations that people will receive, ii) the existence of these future people, and iii) their preferences? This paper investigates this question, which can arise when considering policies, such as climate policy, that affect people who do not yet exist. We start from the observation that there is no social ordering that meets minimal requirements of fairness, social rationality, and respect for people...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit; Peretz, Ron; Tsodikovich, Yevgeny
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Bar Ilan University; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：Agents in a network adopt an innovation if a certain fraction of their neighbors has already done so. We study the minimal contagious set size required for a successful innovation adoption by the entire population, and provide upper and lower bounds on it. Since detailed information about the network structure is often unavailable, we study bounds that depend only on the degree distribution of the network-a simple statistic of the network topology. Moreover, as our bounds are robust to small c...
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作者：Dogan, Battal; Erdil, Aytek
作者单位：University of Bristol; University of Cambridge
摘要：Widening access to higher education remains a significant policy goal. Universities often frame and pursue these goals via access targets (target number of students from disadvantaged backgrounds) as part of their intake targets (target total number of students). However, universities' desire to exercise flexibility in their access and intake targets constitutes a novel challenge in designing a centralised admissions system. We introduce the Flexible Access and Intake Targets mechanism that is...
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作者：Caplin, Andrew; Martin, Daniel; Marx, Philip
作者单位：New York University; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Louisiana State University System; Louisiana State University Shreveport
摘要：We investigate whether the predictions of modern machine learning algorithms are consistent with economic models of human cognition. To test these models we run an experiment in which we vary the loss function used in training a leading deep learning convolutional neural network to predict pneumonia from chest X-rays. The first cognitive economic model we test, capacity- constrained learning, corresponds with an intuitive notion of machine learning: that an algorithm chooses among a feasible s...
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作者：Dziewulski, Pawel
作者单位：University of Sussex
摘要：We develop a revealed preference method for studying preferences of individuals whose choices may be inconsistent with utility maximisation. We show that acyclicity of the strict revealed preference is necessary and sufficient for the data to be rationalisable with approximate utility maximisation. In this model, an alternative is selected from a menu only if its utility is not significantly lower than that of any other available option. This allows us to test for consumer behaviour that is su...
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作者：Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This paper examines incentives in teams of career-concerned members, where effort and talent can be substitutes (Holmstr & ouml;m, 1999) or complements (Dewatripont et al., 1999). It is shown that the degree of effort-talent complementarity determines which team member exerts more effort and thus gains or loses more reputation following team performance. The paper argues that organizations can boost incentives by promoting concern for collective reputation. Strategies to achieve this include f...
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作者：Baughman, Garth
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：Deadlines and fixed end dates are pervasive in matching markets. Deadlines drive fundamental non-stationarity and complexity in behavior, generating significant departures from the steadystate equilibria usually studied in the search and matching literature. I consider a two-sided matching market with search frictions where vertically differentiated agents attempt to form bilateral matches before a deadline. I give novel proofs of existence and uniqueness of equilibria, and show that all equil...
