The dynamic (In) stability of backwards induction
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Cressman, R; Schlag, KH
署名单位：
Wilfrid Laurier University; University of Bonn
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.2465
发表日期：
1998
页码：
260-285
关键词：
摘要：
The evolutionary basis for predicting the backwards induction solution in finite extensive-form games with perfect information is examined. Evolution is modelled using the replicator dynamic in combination with rare perturbations that introduce a small change in the proportion of each strategy. The criterion for our judgement is whether this dynamic stabilizes over time at the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. We find that the backwards induction solution is fully justified by this process only in very simple games. Examples of more complex games are given in which this process does not select between the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome and alternative Nash equilibrium outcomes. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C79. (C) 1998 Academic Press.