Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Konishi, H; Le Breton, M; Weber, S
署名单位：
Southern Methodist University; Institut Universitaire de France
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2386
发表日期：
1998
页码：
224-244
关键词：
摘要：
This paper examines the existence of a noncooperative equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy where consumers have quasi-linear preferences. Jurisdictions consist of consumers who chose the same public project and finance the cost of production of public goods through either a proportional income tax or a poll tax. We show that under a proportional income tax scheme a Nash equilibria may fail to exist. Under a poll tax scheme an equilibrium always exists but, in general. Nash equilibria violate a very weak efficiency condition. We conclude by commenting on the stabilizing effect of zoning policies. (C) 1998 Academic Press.