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作者：Sandroni, A
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：In this paper I consider a dynamically complete market model without intrinsic uncertainty. The only uncertainty is modelled by sunspots. Agents' beliefs are heterogeneous, but eventually become homogeneous in the sense that agents' beliefs are identical in the limit. I show that if some states of nature occur rarely, then arbitrarily large market crashes may occur infinitely often. This result contrasts with Cass and Shell's (J. Polit. Econ. 91 (1983), 193-227) results which show that when be...
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作者：Shi, SY
作者单位：Queens University - Canada
摘要：This paper examines a monetary propagation mechanism in an economy where exchanges in goods and labor markets involve costly search. It is shown that an increase in the money growth rate increases steady state employment and output when the money growth rate is low but reduces steady state employment and output when the money growth rate is already high. The model produces persistent, hump-shaped responses in employment and output to money growth shocks even when the shocks have no persistence...
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作者：Weder, M
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：This paper develops a three sector dynamic general equilibrium model with the specific aim of evaluating the role of consumer durables in the generation and propagation of business cycles. The model displays indeterminacy at commonly considered realistic parameter restrictions and basically constant returns to scale. If calibrated at modest increasing returns to scale, the sunspots driven model version produces a close match to moments of aggregate U.S. data. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Makowski, L; Ostroy, JM
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：In a model of an exchange economy with a continuum of individuals, we show that competitive equilibrium can be regarded as resulting from the elimination of arbitrage opportunities. Generically, the elimination of such opportunities results in a phenomenon we call the flattening effect of large numbers. The flattening effect provides a precise meaning to the statement that under perfect competition individuals cannot influence prices; they face perfectly elastic demands and supplies. The attra...
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作者：Hong, L
作者单位：Syracuse University; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper considers Feasible Bayesian implementation for an environment with state dependent feasible sets. We assume no externality in individual feasibility constraint sets and no exaggeration on the part of agents, but allow for flexible information structures. Bayesian Incentive Compatibility, Closure, and Bayesian Monotonicity are found to be necessary and sufficient for Feasible Bayesian implementation. This result is applied to an exchange economy where agents have fixed preferences bu...
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作者：Glazer, J; Rubinstein, A
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University; Princeton University
摘要：A number of experts receive noisy signals regarding a desirable public decision. The public target is to make the best possible decision on thr basis of all the information held by the experts. We compare two cultures. Tn one, all experts are driven only by the public motive to increase the probability that the desirable action will be taken. In the second, each expert is also driven by a private motive: to have his recommendation accepted. We show that in the First culture, every mechanism wi...
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作者：Serrano, R; Shimomura, K
作者单位：Brown University; University of Osaka
摘要：We extend Nash's bargaining theory to non-convex and coalitional problems. This paper investigates the implications of Nash-like axioms for bilateral problems and the properties of consistency and converse consistency over multilateral settings. The result is a characterization of the Nash set of NTU games, defined as the solution concept where each pair of players is splitting the gains from trade at a point where the Nash product of their utilities, subject to efficiency, is critical. The in...
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作者：Aoyagi, M
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：This paper studies a model of a two-armed bandit played in parallel by two or more players. Players observe the actions of all other players, but not the outcome of their experiments. It is shown that if the parameters of the two arms (i.e., their success probabilities) are different by a fixed margin, all players eventually settle on the same arm with probability one in any Nash equilibrium of the game. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Bhattacharya, J; Guzman, MG; Shell, K
作者单位：Cornell University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Buffalo, SUNY; Wellesley College
摘要：We investigate sunspot equilibria in a static, one-commodity model with taxes and transfers denominated in money units. Volatility in this economy is purely monetary, since the only uncertainty is about the price level. We construct simple, robust examples of sunspot equilibria that are not mere randomizations over certainty equilibria. We also identify the source of these SSEs: Equilibrium in the securities market is determined as if there were no restricted consumers and the unrestricted con...
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作者：Cremer, J; Khalil, F; Rochet, JC
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Universitaire de France; University of Southampton; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：In a Baron-Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a contract. For intermediate values of the cost of acquiring information, the agent's equilibrium strategy will be a mixed strategy: He will acquire information with a probability strictly between 0 and 1. We identify the contract that the principal will offer to such a maybe informed agent. (C) 1998 Academic Pr...
