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作者：Sprumont, Y
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We ask how the best known mechanisms for solving cost sharing problems with homogeneous cost functions-the value, proportional, and serial mechanisms-should be extended to arbitrary problems. We propose the Ordinality axiom, which requires that cost shares should be invariant under (essentially) all increasing transformations of the measuring scales. Following the value approach first, we present an axiomatization of the Shapley-Shubik rule based on Ordinality. Next, we define and axiomatize t...
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作者：Heifetz, A
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：In their seminal paper, Mertens and Zamir (Int. Game Theory 14 (1985), 1-29) proved the existence of a universal Harsanyi type space which consists of all possible types. Their method of proof depends crucially on topological assumptions. Whether such assumptions are essential to the existence of a universal space remained an open problem. Here we prove that a universal type space does exist even when spaces an defined in pure measure theoretic terms. Heifetz and Samet (mimeo, Tel Aviv Univers...
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作者：Franke, G; Stapleton, RC; Subrahmanyam, MG
作者单位：University of Konstanz; Lancaster University; New York University
摘要：In this paper, we derive an equilibrium in which some investors buy call/put options on the market portfolio while others sell them. Since investors are assumed to have similar risk-averse preferences, the demand for these contracts is not explained by differences in the shape of utility functions. Rather, it is the degree to which agents face other, non-hedgeable, background risks that determines their risk-taking behavior in the model. We show that investors with low or no background risk ha...
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作者：Fudenberg, D; Levine, D; Pesendorfer, W
作者单位：Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Princeton University
摘要：We examine games played by a single large player and a large number of opponents who are small, but not anonymous. if the Flay of the small players is observed with noise, and if the number of actions the large player controls is bounded as the number of small players grows, the equilibrium set converges to that of the grime where there is a continuum of small players. This paper extends previous work on the negligibility of small players by dropping the assumption that small players' actions ...
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作者：Dutta, J; Michel, P
作者单位：University of Cambridge; Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：In this paper, we study the distribution of wealth in an economy with infinitely lived families. Individual generations of each family may or may not be altruistic. This is represented as a preference shock which follows a first-order Markov process within each Family, a feature representing imperfect altruism. Altruistic individuals care about the welfare of their children and are likely to leave bequests; selfish ones do not. This results in a non-trivial distribution of wealth among familie...
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作者：Hon-Snir, S; Monderer, D; Sela, A
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Mannheim
摘要：We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then after sufficiently long time, the players' bids are in equilibrium in the one-shot auction in which the types are commonly known. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Kajii, A; Morris, S
作者单位：University of Tsukuba; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：An incomplete information game is defined by a probability distribution mu over a type space and payoff functions u. Probability distribution mu' is strategically close to mu if, for any bounded payoff functions u and any equilibrium of the game (mu, u), there exists an approximate equilibrium of the game (mu', u) under which all players get approximately the same payoffs. This note shows that two probability distributions are strategically close if and only if (1) they assign similar ex ante ...
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作者：Polemarchakis, HM; Siconolfi, P
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Columbia University
摘要：Competitive equilibrium allocations are indeterminate when the net trades in commodities are constrained, while the asset market is incomplete. The model encompasses economies with deferred payment for commodities, economies with nominal assets, and economies with bundling of commodities and assets. (C) 1998 Academic Press
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作者：Benhabib, J; Nishimura, K
作者单位：New York University; Kyoto University
摘要：We show that indeterminacy can easily arise in multisector models that have constant variable returns to scale and very small market imperfections. This is in sharp contrast to models that require increasing returns to generate indeterminacy and which have been criticized on the basis of recent empirical estimates indicating that returns to scale are roughly constant and that market imperfections are small. We also show that we can calibrate our constant returns model with sunspots, using stan...
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作者：Tourky, R
作者单位：La Trobe University
摘要：Aliprantis, Brown, and Burkinshaw (Econometrica 55 (1987), 1109-1137) proved that Edgeworth equilibria for exchange economies in topological vector lattices are pseudo-equilibria. In this paper we extend their result to more general spaces. We consider pure trade economies in a vector lattice commodity space with a lattice ordered price space. By adapting the techniques of Mas-Colell and Richard (J. Econ. Theory 53 (1991), 1-11) we obtain the required decentralizing continuous price as the sup...
